نشریه فلسفه
سال چهل و هشتم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1399)

Alain Badiou considers art as one of the fourfold conditions of his philosophy. That is, if there were no artistic truths for philosophy to address, there would be no philosophy. Such a relationship between philosophy and art, however, is challenging and has provoked critical responses. This article is aimed to evaluate this relationship, which Badiou called conditioning, and to demonstrate the fact that the true status of art in Badiou's philosophy is not the same as he claims. While encountering Mallarme's poetry, like other artistic works he encountered, Badiou regards it as a masked philosophy rather than “art”. He treats artists as if they are philosophers in other genres. Furthermore, there are reasons to conclude that, in spite of "the theory of conditions", there is no discernible interaction between art and philosophy in Badiou’s work.

Gilles Deleuze, the great postmodern philosopher, in his cinematic works, Cinema 1: movement-image and Cinema 2: time-image, provides a profound and unique narrative of the relation between philosophy and cinema, which seems to go beyond the usual theory of film. It is the very idea of a connection between image and reality, or cinema and ontology of the image, which makes a huge distance between his views on the cinematic and conventional theoretical-cinematic approaches. In this paper, by depicting Deleuze’s cinematic thinking, we will show its special significance in the film critique field and even in the philosophical thought. It is not by accident that his philosophy begins with the priority of simulacrum and image in a project called ‘overturning Platonism’. We consider how Deleuze regards cinema as a form of philosophizing (and vice versa) and how they can change or expand the boundaries of each other; at the same time, we examine the powers and limitations of this approach, in terms of some sort of elitism which we can find in his books. Understanding Deleuze’s cinematic thought allows us to rethink the constantly consolidated themes of traditional philosophy and even to recognize the mutual dynamism and linkage of thought with modern phenomena such as cinema, as a special field which works with movement, time and image.

The aim of the present research is to elaborate and interpret human communication based on narration and re–reading the concept of friendship in a mythological communication. While poets and ancient Greek thinkers used the term mythos for Word, after Socrates the term mythos was substituted by the term logos and logos became common. In this research, by interpretation of logos in Heidegger’s Phenomenology tradition and through Gadamer’s Hermeneutic, it will be illustrated how dialogue based on logos manifests in a co-breathing concept. I draw this main question that in case of restoring and retrieving the dignity of mythos meaning as a Word, then how mythos appears in a friendly dialogue and what is the characteristics of such a communication?  I draw another question through which asking that if the presence of logos  in a live dialogue leads to re-animate of soul (Psyche) and comes about to co-breathing moment, whether a mythological communication also will be an introvertive communication? Ricour’s reading of Augustine’s theory of Time, made a contribution to illustrate the relation between soul and mythos, as my subordinate hypothesis. Also, for achieving the telos of communication based on mythos I use Recour’s hermeneutic phenomenology to show how a real dialogue in the position of mythos will be an opportunity for intimate solitude.

Over the past decades, the development of medical technology and economic concerns, as well as the expansion of health specialization, causes the dehumanizing of this field. This has led to the neglect of the effect of psychological and environmental aspects on the patient during treatment, and the health staff only pays attention to the patient's biological body, which led to their misbehavior with the patient. To solve their problems, health care professionals have resorted to various philosophical schools, such as phenomenology. Phenomenology, with its various doctrines, such as in bracketing of presuppositions and prejudices, allows us to describe reality as it appears to us. Undoubtedly, one of the realities we face in our daily lives is health and illness. While in the field of modern medicine, illness is defined as the dysfunctioning of organs and systems of the body and health as the lack of these disorders, Emphasizing the lived experience of individuals, phenomenology makes it possible to reveal psychological and environmental aspects of illness and health. Paying attention to these aspects of illness and health changes the meaning of illness and health. According to these phenomenological meanings, the illness is no longer limited to the patient's biological body, but his body is considered as a lived body, a body with different dimensions of existence, each of which can have a significant impact in his illness. Paying attention to this level of the body and the phenomenological meanings of health and illness will bring the horizons of the patient's vision and the field of treatment closer together and they will communicate better with each other.

The following paper follows first of all Heidegger’s question concerning meaning of Being in his early works. Then it deals with his answer to that question, which is remainded unchanged in spite of the great transformations of his Being-problematic: According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being in the western history of thinking i.e. in the metaphysics has been understood always as “presence" (Anwesenheit). Heidegger not only doesn’t oppose this historical answer, but also has reflected it in his philosophical thinking. The most important consequence of this move is the emergence of the term Dasein, in that lies the meaning of Being or presence too. Heidegger owed this great ontological position to his lengthy philosophical dialogue with Aristotel. Finally this article shows how Heidegger develops step by step the presence from an Aristotelian-metaphysical position of being in general or being as such, into something concerning his special term Dasein, which includes exclusively the human being. Now human Dasein is presented by or for himself and in the world as Being-in-the-World.

In this paper, we review the relationship between science and the perfectionism of material beings by considering the Mulla Sadra's philosophical perspectives. Mulla Sadra, by proving the "enthusiasm of matter in the form" and presenting the theory of the "substantial motion" as well as referring to the flow of "love" in the universe; he displays a novel page of the universe's endeavor to the intended home and describes the enthusiasm, motion, and love in the universe as accompanying and parallel to science that introduces the cause of the general and extensive perfectibility of (material) beings and the promotion of their degree of existence and goal-directed departure towards "absolute completeness" (God the most high necessary existent). Also, Mulla Sadra, by being influenced by the verses of the Qur'an and the words of the mystics, clarifies the relationship between the components of the universe and their perfectionism goal; and with his unifying insight, considers the interpretation of verses such as (Behold, eventually all affairs go to Allah) that all universe is generated from God and is moving towards the Almighty God. The understanding wisdom of the motion, enthusiasm, and love in the path of perfectibility (in material beings) has evolved our approach and worldview toward creation.

Move and change versus stability, is one of the long-standing issues of philosophy which the great philosophers have long tried to explain and analyze it. For this reason, the study of the external being of the motion has also entered the discussions of great philosophers such as Mirdamad. Mirdamad presents his theory of the external existence of motion in several general sections: Definition of the medial motion and traversal motion, Providing the proof to prove external existence traversal motion and the mental or imaginary existence of medial motion, external existence of traversal motion in Ibn Sina's expressions and theories. In the present study, Mirdamad's theory has been critically examined in these fields and it was proved that Mirdamad's definition of the traversal motion is further explanation of the Ibn Sina's view of the medial motion and it has nothing to do with the definition of traversal motion, which Ibn Sina considers mental and imaginary. Therefore, there is no difference between the traversal motion that Mirdamad considers it external with the moving in the medial motion that Ibn Sina considers it external. However, Mirdamad insists on the semantic difference between the two by quoting and arguing phrases from Ibn Sina's books. But it seems that the quoted and argued expressions do not imply Mirdamad's claim and do not prove his theory.

Hans Reichenbach has two contrast readings in The Theory of Relativity and APrioriKnowledge (1920) and TheRiseonScientific Philosophy (1951) from Kant's synthetic a priori judgments. The second book rethinking synthetic a priori through the theory of relativity, but The first book seeks to reject these judgments. in 1920, by the distinction between axioms of connection and coordination, he presented two different conceptions of Kant's the a priori: 1. Necessary and unrevisable, 2. The constitutive object of knowledge. Reichenbach maintains the second meaning by rejecting the first meaning and knows it an Einstein doctrine. He blames early positivism for not paying attention to the role of axioms of coordination. Reichenbach's ideas about relativized a priori can reflect and consider: 1. Choosing an approach between Kant and earlier empiricism in the review of synthetic a priori to relativized a priori, 2. Accessing an ideal of definitive scientific philosophy despite critique on Kant's absolutism, 3. inattention to differences in the concept of the convention with Poincaré and logical positivists, 4. Neglecting from link Einstein's theory of relativity with Kant's synthetic a priori, 5. Lack of a clear pattern for separating the principle a priori from the principle experimental. The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct, completion, and development Reichenbach's theory of relativized a priori in the methodology of science.

Arguing against relativism and constructivism and defending objectivism, Paul Boghossian considers three theories concerning description-dependence of fact, including Putnam's theory on the interpenetration of fact and convention. Boghossian holds that the basis of Putnam's theory is the phenomenon of conceptual relativity; so, if we reject his view about the phenomenon, his theory will be rejected. Accordingly, He explains this phenomenon and criticizes Putnam's attitudes towards it and finally concludes that this ‘argument’ cannot prove Putnam's theory. Here firstly it will be argued that Putnam himself was aware of these objections and had developed some ideas to solve them; so, using his texts and arguments, we try to reply to the main objections of Boghossian to Putnam's view about this phenomenon. Secondly, it will be argued that, in contrast to Bogghossian's belief, Putnam's theory is not based on the phenomenon of conceptual relativity. Instead, the idea of the interpenetration of fact and convention is based on two other arguments: the model-theoretic argument and the argument from the brain-in-a-vat scenario. Therefore, even if Boghossian's objections to Putnam's view about the phenomenon of conceptual relativity were acceptable, they could not reject Putnam's ideas on the interpenetration of fact and convention.

Two main approaches to solve one group of liar paradox's versions _that is, the group in which demonstratives are used_ are denying self-reference sentences and denying that the liar sentence is a statement, which is the primary and genuine bearer of truth. The major problem with the first approach is that they have not explained why we do not have self-referential sentences and usually try to omit them with conventions. The main problem with the second approach is that they have not explained why the liar sentence would not constitute a statement. We, in this inquiry, after casting a new twosome division for all versions of the liar paradox, will present a solution, or probably a way of dissolution, for a cluster of the versions, namely the cluster in which demonstratives are used explicitly or implicitly_ a solution that, in a way, has the two approaches in it. The solution is this: since firstly propositions are primary and essential bearers of truth and secondly pointing out to an inexistent that is neither existent nor in relation with an existent is impossible, so no proposition in correspondence with the sentence "this sentence is false" is formed in our minds, because before this sentence is formed completely and before ascribing the predicate to the subject, no sentence was formed so that we could refer to it and ascribe a predicate to it. So we would not have any propositions in correspondence with the sentence so that it would be descripted to the truth/falsity primarily and by-itself and the sentence would be true/false by virtue of it, because a portion of the sentence_ namely the subject_ has not sense, namely before predication we do not have “this sentence”.

The reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy on the basis of desire and negativity is a new work that seeks to reinterpret idealist philosophy with a psychoanalytic approach based on the individual subject. From Hegel's thought, the fascinating idea of ​​the desire and necessity of negativity is formed as the main pillars of self-consciousness, but because of the originality he attaches to the concept of absolute, he does not narrate it very faithfully to the individual; Leaves room for other interpretations with commentators. This category becomes a milestone for the Frankfurt School's critical approach to re-establishing the Hegelian subject's failed connection with the world and trying to address its shortcomings. In this category, it is clear that the subject's relationship with the world around him is formed based on desire and emotions, and the continuation of the path of self-consciousness to reach an effective and revolutionary subject requires a view based on these two concepts. The present challenge shapes the subject of this article and shows how the absolute in Hegel's thought opens the way for the necessary presence of art to the point where, instead of the end of art, its beginning is announced again. By adopting this view that we need to re-read our unconsiousness, our imagination, and our fantacies so that we can return from head to our feet again.