فصلنامه تحقیقات کلامی
پیاپی 29 (تابستان 1399)

Robert Tennant is one of the first philosophers who tried to solve the conflict between the Order Argument and the theory of evolution. Accepting the theory of evolution, he emphasized on the purposeful characteristic of the evolution process. His inductive explanation of the Order Argument is based on the order in the world as a whole and he draw the world by its intertwined plurality of six coherent species. Basis on the epistemological and ontological aspects of beauty in the natural world is one of the advantages of this argument. In this research, by a descriptive-analytic method, at first we tried to explain Tennant Argument and then give an adequate evaluation of it on the basis of the Islamic thought. The achievements of the research show that Tennant’s view about the world as a whole is comparable with the theory of personal unity of the natural world in the Islamic thought and the theory of evolution, assuming it is correct, is not in conflict with proving prudence in the whole universe.

The al-Wāḥid rule (the one does not emanate of it except one) is one of the important and controversial philosophical rules that had been paid attention by philosophers and theologians. From the beginning of its setting forth in the Islamic world, this theory has been accepted by the philosophers and denied by many of theologians. Philosophers like al-Fārābī and Avicenna have set forth and proved this theory in the Islamic world. One can say that all the important demonstrations to prove this rule have been set forth by Avicenna. In this regard, by numerous evidences such as limitedness in God’s power or regarding God as being an obliged agent, the theologians apposed this theory. One of these theologians is Ibn Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī that criticized this rule on the basis of incoherence of this rule with the speeches of the philosophers themselves as well as claiming limitedness of the Divine power. This article examined the history of the al-Wāḥid rule, its conceptual clarification and the Ibn Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī’s arguments and criticisms in order.

Criticism is one of the influential ways for evaluation of views and thoughts and discerning the strong and weak points of the authors’ works. Using this way one can distinguish between wright and wrong. Amongst the ways of criticism, the methodic criticism is of many priorities. Written in a descriptive-analytic method and on the basis of library sources, this research is based on this hypothesis that the Wahhabis specially the author of the book ‘Uṣūlu Madhhab al-Shi’a committed fallacies in many cases because of incorrect hypotheses, revenge and jealousy, cultural difference, scholarly weakness and so on. The examination shows that the book ‘Uṣūlu Madhhab al-Shi’a, instead of using scientific method, used fallacies of personal attack, lie, inadequate generalization, distortion, incorrect interpretation, fabricated cause, claim of improvisation, resorting to false source, provoking emotions and allegorical fallacy and did not use a scientific method to criticize Shi’ism.

Deduction of the Kalāmī teachings which is one of the most important duties of the Kalām knowledge is performed on the basis of rational and narrative ways. In the present article which is collected in a library and descriptive way, the rational argumentation methods in the Kalāmī School of Shiraz has been examined. It was a school that for three centuries that are the eighth/fourteenth, ninth/fifteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries was the basic center for a group of great thinkers like MīrSayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Ṣadr ulDīn Dashtakī, Jalāl ul-Dīn Dawwānī, Ghiyāth ul-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī, Muḥaḳḳiḳ khafrī and…. By describing and analyzing the rational arguments used for defending the beliefs as well as the Kalāmī books existed in this school, on can understand that the thinkers of this school were theologianphilosophers and can discover their methods of rational argumentations in deduction of the Kalāmī propositions. Because of its history of foundation by some Sunny theologians and then converting its approach to Shi’ism, this Kalāmī school did not use the practical reason so much in the belief issues, but used theoretical reason by ways such as impossibility of circulation, infinite chain of causes, preferring without a preferable and arguments like contradiction (khulf) argument, priori reason, posteriori reason, sabr and taḳsīm (test and division) argument, taḍāyuf (mutual relation) argument, wāḥid and majmū’ (single and total) argument, correspondence and also rational consequence.

Although there is no opposition between the level of innate knowledge and the understanding of the principles of values, at first glance there seems an opposition and duality between knowledge and surrender. Rational knowledge also prepares, instead of duality, the background for surrender. Rationally there is no opposition between imitation and reasoning. The main part of this confrontation is due to ignoring reason’s command to its limitations and mistakes, which brings about the roots of clashes and, consequently, varieties of confrontations. With a descriptive-analytic method, this article tried to explain the encounter of some Ash’rite, Mu’tazilite and Shi’ite thinkers to the duality of thinking and surrender and show their resolutions to solve this challenge. It can be concluded that we are faced with a wide range of different views on the approach of reason in dealing with religious discussions and how to deduce the jurisprudential rules in Islam. Some groups consider it as necessary to use reason and rational reasons as a source and origin to gain this knowledge. The Mu'tazilite and Shiite theological schools are part of this group.

The divine power is one of the issues that the Muslim theologians and philosophers explored it from old times. Some of the Islamic philosophers consider the creation of the universe on the basis of essential power and will and then the universe as eternal. The theologians, on the contrary, believe that God at first leaved the creation of the world and then His power belonged to the creation of the world. Thus the universe is created. The philosophers do not accept their view and impose many objections on them. Khwājah Ṭūsī answers the objections of philosophers. By a library method and analytic way, this writing wants to analyze the objections of the philosophers and examine the answers of Khwājah Naṣīr to them from two angles: answers on the basis of the theological views and answers on the basis of the theological-philosophical way of Khwājah Naṣīr himself. The result of the analysis of these two philosophical and theological thoughts is that the answers of Khwājah to the objections on the pure theological views of the theologians are not sufficient. But despite the apparent conflict between his view and the philosophers' view about God's power, by distinguishing between the philosophers' ontological view and Khwājah Naṣīr's epistemological view, a solution can be found to the apparent conflict between the philosophers' and Khwājah's views on God's power.