نشریه فلسفه
سال چهل و هشتم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

Price's theory of sensory perception is based on sensory data and Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance. Price separates between knowledge of sense-date and perceptual acceptance. In his view, belief in the external world takes place during these two stages. Sense data are mantel states that are subject to direct intuition and are infallible and perceptual acceptance also is a pseudo-intuitive act. Price's theory is an example of the “prima facie justification” theory in internalist foundationalism that is comparable with the view of Chisholm and Pollack and BonJour. Many critics believe that this theory is very optimistic and an example of dogmatic foundationalism that accept external world as mere assumption. However, Chisholm tries to revises this view by relying on concept of “self-presenting”. BonJour too by reliance on passivity in sensory perception and best explanation argument provides a base for knowledge of the external world. The result of these defenses shows the necessity of attention to different knowledge from propositional knowledge i.e. knowledge by presence and rational argument in believing to the external world. The main point is that the nature of knowledge consists of showing its object and this showing is prima facie evidence for the external reality that appeared to us in assuming the health of the senses and by best explanation argument this prima facie evidence becomes a good reason for believing to the external world.

The present article tries to provide a new classification of intelligibles (primary and secondary intelligibles) in Avicenna’s philosophical system and tries to show the real place of philosophical concepts like existence, unity, necessity and etc. in his thought based on this classification. In current scholarship the intelligibles are divided into primary and secondary intelligibles. The second intelligibles are divided into philosophical and logical. This division is widely accepted after Nasir al-Din Tusi. In current scholarship usually this theory is attributed to Avicenna as if he also divided the second intelligibles into philosophical and logical intelligibles. The present research tries to show that Avicenna does not consider the philosophical concepts as second intelligibles but more primary than any other primary concepts. According to him, among the concepts there must be primary concepts on which all other concepts rely. These concepts are present in the mind from childhood and in the level of the intellect in habitu (al-‘aql bi’l malakah). So the first intelligibles, for Avicenna, are divided into two categories: the essential ones or the intelligibles from quiddities and the philosophical ones like existence, unity and necessity which are present for us primarily. The second intelligibles for Avicenna are just logical ones.

In this paper, I attempt to interpret Gadamer’s critical approach to Heidegger’s conception of tradition and language of metaphysics. This interpretation is based on finding the ground of this critique in their different understandings concerning the problem of the finitude of truth. That problem signifies the unavailability of the ground of the phenomenality of phenomena and the impossibility of founding of the ontological truth on the absolute presence in its immediacy or total mediation. According to a brief interpretation of the finitude of the event of truth in Heidegger’s later thought with reference to the basic concept of “facticity”, I attempt to reveal how Gadamer essentially modifies the Heideggerian central idea of abyss, i.e. the concealment of event of truth, and its unavailability for metaphysical concepts, and how he negates the transcending origin of Heidegger’s later thinking concerning the metaphysics and thereby leads the finitude of truth back to traditionally metaphysical concepts. It will be illuminated firstly through Gadamer’s interpretation of facticity as belonging to tradition in his theory of history of influence with reference to Hegel, i.e. the identification of truth with “the whole” and understanding of this whole as history; secondly through the interpretation of the finitude of truth as a permanent unfinished process of total unification in the dialogue between our understanding and the historical tradition with reference to the concepts of “perspective” and “horizon” in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception.

The Classical and the Presence of Truth in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics.This paper is concentrated on the brief investigation in Gadamer’s book Truth and Method about the meaning of the attribute “classical” which is applied to works of literature and art. Explicating this investigation as an example which shows obviously the manner of presence and existence of what is called “the historical” in the middle of its temporality and its claim for a supratemporal truth, we try to illuminate the meaning of a concept which Gadamer calles - with reference to Heidegger - “historicity” and “historical Being” and applies it to the classical works of art. In this paper we attempt to explain how Gadamer’s investigation on the attribute “classical” can show concretely that his understanding of the historicity of truth, of the claim of works of art for truth and the truth in the historical tradition is not on the one hand involved in assumption of a metaphysical sphere and a naive and abstract rationality which is not related to the reality of the historical tradition and its specific authority, on the other hand is not entangled by historicism and historical relativism, but rather can claim the consistent presence of truth through the history.

Mathematical, physical, and theological sciences are separate and segregated sciences, but concurrently have a kind of unity. This is not so-called generic unity, but as a consequence of the specific unity of the meaning of being, is a special structure called Analogical unity i.e unity according to priority and latency. This structure, on the one hand, is a factor for distinguishing scientific disciplines and preventing their mix-up, on the other hand, it warranties the integrity and unity of philosophy. Therefore"Philosophy" applies firstly upon theology, then upon physics, and according to priority and latency applies upon other sciences which themselves have parts that are arranged according to the same rule and construct the network of the system of sciences. In this article, we investigate how Aristotle accomplish this special unity. In the introductory books of metaphysics, Aristotle first, in the great Alfa, characterizes the wisdom or Sofia as knowledge of the first causes and principles, then in Beta in the first Aporia, shows the perplexity between the unity and multiplicity of wisdom, and in the next step in Gamma for eliminating this bewilderment establishes his specific theory, that is to say, the unifying structure in the multiplicity of wisdom. Therefore ought not to consider so-called general metaphysics as unit separate science but as second-order science, only establishes under the multiplicity of philosophical sciences.

The main problem of this research is to explain distinguishing knowledge from the mental existence from Javadi-Amoli’s view. The findings of this paper are: Knowledge is originally a type of immediate knowledge, earned by intuition, but mental existence of a real object is a mediate knowledge that is produced in light of the radiation of knowledge. Although actually the radiation of knowledge is emanated by God, knowledge as well as the mental existence of a real object depend on the human soul as an action depends on the agent performing it. There are prime object known by essence, i.e. original radiation of knowledge, which is united with object of knowledge; and grade two of object known by essence, i.e. a mental picture of object in the real world. When human soul reaches a suitable level to receive the radiation of knowledge, in light of this illumination, human soul can produce a gleam of existence along with a mental picture, correspondent to the real object. Then, mediate knowledge is based on immediate knowledge. Producing mediate knowledge, human being faces two problems to cause the error: first, the more powerful human soul more powerful and clear radiation of knowledge to be bestowed, but the less power of human soul the weak radiation of knowledge is bestowed; second, the necessity of transformation of immediate knowledge into mediate knowledge, so, it is a possibility of mistake during making this transformation. Thus, she cannot be dogmatic about the truth and correctness of her mediate knowledge.

In the view of the mystics, the Divine Essence is the “Unconditional Existence that is the Subject of Division of Existence.” This Being is incapable of being understood due to its limitlessness and undetermined nature. The result of the incapability of the understanding of the Divine Essence is that it no ruling is capable of being passed regarding it. This is something that the mystics have explicitly stated. The impossibility of the understanding of the Divine Essence and the incapability of passing any judgment regarding it results in many problems. For example, the Divine Essence will be incapable of being worshipped. Secondly, this contradicts the religious texts that speak of the possibility of understanding God. Thirdly, it opposes some rules that we pass regarding Him, such as “His being existent.” In order to free themselves from this problem, some mystics have admitted that it is possible to understand the Divine Essence in a somewhat ambiguous and concise manner.  They have said that the demonstrations that are mentioned to prove that knowledge of the Divine Essence is impossible are specifically concerned with the complete and elaborate knowledge of God. These mystics present three important interpretations for the aforementioned “concise” knowledge. All of these mystics seek to justify the direct knowledge of the Divine Essence in such a manner that the thing that knowledge is directly concerned with is nothing but the Divine Essence. However, based upon the limitlessness of the Divine Essence, the direct understanding of God seems to be impossible, even if it be in a concise manner. This research paper divides understanding into direct and indirect knowledge. The analysis of the All-Pervasive Being and the Station of Simplicity and the discovery that these things need a reality beyond them is a type of indirect understanding of the Divine Essence that is capable of being expressed in the forms of concepts. The thing that this knowledge is related to is not the Divine Essence. So, it is not negated by the demonstrations that conclude that the Divine Essence is incapable of being understood. This knowledge is related to what the All-Pervasive Being and the Station of Simplicity externally depict, i.e. the Divine Essence that lies beyond them. This external depiction of the Divine Essence resembles a type of indirect knowledge of that Essence.

The relation between mind and language which is nowadays generally examined in terms of physicality view is a questionable relationship. The neurologic scientist and physiologist investigate this type of relationship through more surfing human mind. The philosophers more particularly and using the philosophic method, examining this relation by ontology and epistemology and the psychologist do the same based on the structure and works of human mind and psycho. Edmund Husserl, the phenomenologist philosopher, believed that language is a device towards the meaning transformation and not more for this to be highly significant. Mind is the source of meanings which comprises not only this as a perfect form, but also the expressive content, from its linguistic type is nothing outside the ideal meanings. For this, Husserl tries to search the pure linguistic expression in this ideal way and mind. On the other side, based on Husserl, the logic which is the coordinator of the inner and outer world of human mind, is being abused and it should be redefined other than its additional indulgent aspect. Therefore, the indulgent aspect is comprised based on Husserl’s formative thought process and projected as the inferential phenomenology which included the discussion of logic, mind and language. In this research, it is tried to focus on the relationship between mind and language as well as to analyse the expression of the process.

The problem of free will has historically evolved. What is observed in the contemporary period with the emergence of empirical science is the relationship between free will and physical determinism. Although physical determinism has been weakened in some approaches to empirical science, the free will problem still remains strong in philosophical debates. What is discussed in this article can be shown as the following argument. 1. Determinism is either true or false; 2. If determinism is correct, the past determines the future, and consequently our will, and therefore we do not have free will; 3. If determinism is wrong, in an undetermined world, the human will is by chance and not free; 4. Therefore, in any case, we do not have free will. The first introduction is an obvious and true statement. The second premise is the content of the consequence argument and the third premise is the claim of the luck argument. The final proposition is the logical result of the preparations. Comparative studies of this article also showed that transcendental wisdom, through accepting the luck argument and not providing an acceptable answer to the consequence argument, must accept the final result of this argument, which is the rejection of free will. In general, it seems that no acceptable theoretical solution to the contemporary problem of free will has been found so far, and a solution to this problem must be sought in practical reasons.

Scientific reduction is one of the most important issues in philosophy of science, which is related to other ones, including scientific realism. In this paper, by taking a clear position on the "concept of reduction" and the "approach to reduction," which we have called "the structural-a priori approach at a specific time," we examine whether or not the limit relations and structural relationships between the two theories hold. Also, by assuming ontic structural realism, explicitly stating the semantic aspect of the reduction, and assuming establishing its epistemological aspect, we respond to the two objections raised against the structuralist approach. These two objections are one resulting from Schaffner's theorem and the other from the ontological considerations. We show that none of them are related to "the structural-a priori approach at a specific time." We also argue that Schaffner's theorem does not undermine the structuralist approach in the general sense, and that ontological objection undermines only at the exorbitant cost of less plausible metaphysical hypotheses; That is, objections can be considered only on the basis of metaphysical hypotheses such as substance, thisness, intrinsic property, haecceity (or something like these); Assumptions that cost more to accept than to accept a structuralist approach.

The rule of oneness (Al-vahed), as one of the most important philosophical rules, has always been considered by philosophers in order to explain the origin of the multiplicity of the universe from one. Most philosophers accepted its provisions, and some theologians denied it. Acceptance of the Al-vahed rule and belief in a single origin for all multiple beings leads the philosopher to the question of how to issue multiplicity from God, who is in all respects one. Meanwhile, Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra also expressed their views on it based on their philosophical and ontological foundations. How many beings originated from a simple unit preoccupied the minds of both, and they, like other philosophers, had to find a way to do so. This article intends to study the works of Thomas and Mulla Sadra and the commentators and researchers in an analytical and research manner to examine the views of two philosophers on the Al-vahed rule to determine whether they both believe in the principle of the rule? What are the reasons for rejecting or accepting the rule in their opinion? How do each justify the emergence of plurals from the unit? Thomas ontologically denies the rule and criticizes those who believe in it. But Mulla Sadra, by accepting the principle of the rule, has restored it and based on his philosophical foundations, has presented a new plan of it.

The question of this article is whether or not the term "Hū" implies the copulative being in the Arabic language of the Quran's revelation period. For this purpose, the works of Avicenna have been formulated as the most prominent defender of the meaning of the word. This formulation shows that his argument is a combination of logical and linguistic parts. The authors first distinguish between these two approaches and critique the logical part of his argument. Then the linguistic part of his argument is compared to Farabi's historical account of the translation movement's dispute over the translation of the concept of "being" into Arabic, and it has also been rejected. Indeed, Farabi's report explains why and how the term was translated by the translators of the translation movement from natural Arabic before the translation movement into the scientific-philosophical language at the same time as the movement and after it. The sum of the critiques and Farabi's report is the key phrase of the article: The term "Hū" in Arabic at the time of the Quran's revelation did not indicate the copulative being; Rather, for the first time, translators of the translation movement considered such a meaning for the term. This result has also helped to discover the historical map for the implication of the term on the copulative being in the Arabic language as a whole; perhaps it can be a companion for parallel research in the field of discovering the original meanings of the Qur'an.

The central issue in this article is to understand the relationship between philosophy and religion in creation in Boethius's thought. To this end, components such as the creation of beings from ex nihilo, God as a cause, the pattern of creation, God's non-obligation in creation, the sempiternity of time and the eternity of God in the Theological Treatises as the representative of Boethius's theology and in the Consolation of Philosophy as the representative of Boethius's philosophy they are studied separately and comparatively by analytical-descriptive method. In the Theological Treatises these components are dealt with according to the doctrine of creation in the Bible and the Christian teachings; but in the Consolation of Philosophy, these components are examined after defining the goodness, acknowledging the existence of God the Creator, and uniting the goodness and God. By comparing the components, presuppositions, method and purpose of Boethius from the topic of creation in the Theological Treatises and in the Consolation ofPhilosophy, we find that Boethius's presumption in explaining this category in both is based on the two principles of God being the creator and the necessity of existence for God. He relies on the Bible in this case. The components that he offers from the doctrine of creation in the Consolation of Philosophy do not violate the components of this doctrine in the Theological Treatises. In both of these he is faithful to the method of the Neoplatonic. The only difference in this discussion is that Boethius insists on proving the goodness in the Consolation of Philosophy, which of course emphasizes the unity of the goodness and God, and it is not the case that by proving the existence of the goodness in this treatise, Boethius reveals the origin of beings other than God.