نشریه فلسفه تحلیلی
پیاپی 32 (پاییز و زمستان 1396)

This essay deals with the problem of the role of the body in emanating actions, from Mulla Sadra’s viewpoint. To study human actions we need, at first, to deal with some basic concepts of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical psychology, such as the hierarchy of the soul, natural body, and ideal body. We find in his psychology two bodies, namely natural body and ideal body. As the soul can’t realize in the natural world without body, it is not deprive of body in isthmus and the stage of imagination. Human actions, according to the hierarchy of levels of being, are associated with both bodies. Indeed, both bodies are the agents of the actions. Therefore, human actions can be divided into corporeal and psychical actions. The former is an action whose agent is natural body, and, with respect to the hierarchy of levels of the soul, its distant agent would be the soul. The latter is an action whose agent would be the animal soul, or the ideal body. In action emanation, the ideal body plays an important role. In fact, according to Sadrian viewpoint, in the process of action emanation, the body, together with the soul, contributes to actions formation and to leading human beings toward perfection and happiness.

Various arguments have been presented in defense of the right to life of the fetus, one of which is the argument from potentiality. Abortion opponents claim that fetal potentiality can be a strong reason to grant them the basic moral rights. That is, fetuses are potential persons upon conception and, given the possibility of natural growth, they will certainly become persons. They have, thus, at least the right to life. Conservatives consider fetal potentiality as a sufficient reason for attributing to fetuses the right to life. They argue that (1) killing a potential human being is wrong, and (2) a fetus is a potential human being. Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus. In contrast, some philosophers, including Mary Anne Warren whose works have attracted attention from many philosophers, believe that the argument from potentiality is not efficient in defending the right to life of fetuses, and reject it for several reasons. In this article, we will study Warren's viewpoint on the argument from potentiality against abortion.

Faith is one of the theological issues in Abrahamic religions. Many thinkers have talked about it and its relation to other topics such as knowledge and reason. Ghazali and Kierkegaard are among those scholars who have discussed faith according to their intellectual foundations. Ghazali believes that faith is an acknowledgment whose beginning is knowledge, but this faith is not of a completely rational type; rather, it is a certain and psychological acknowledgment. Kierkegaard had an existential viewpoint. He regards faith as an inexpressible and paradoxical truth. Faith is accompanied by passion and astonishment, and leads to unity. In this study, we try to compare the similarities and differences of the two thinkers’ viewpoints concerning faith.

In this paper I will try to semantically analyze the subject matter of First Philosophy, i.e. ‘τὸ ὂν’. In doing so, I rely on Charles Kahn’s works. ‘τὸὂν’ in Greek thought mainly refers to what is accessible. This is what mystics mean by “that which is”. To make this clear, I will discuss the Persian equivalent of this Greek word. Then, with reference to Arabic translations of Metaphysics and the equivalents of ‘τὸ εἶναι’, ‘τὸὂν’, and ‘τὸἔστιν’ in these texts, I will semantically analyze those equivalents among which Mawjūd is the most prominent. I will show the background of this word in the Arabic language and especially in The Translation Movement. Finally, I will explain the semantic relation between Mawjūd and its Greek equivalent.

This paper works with the assumptions that the modern political theory is based on geometry: the ‎political geometry of the inside and outside. It also considers that the fundamental concept of ‎political philosophy is neither freedom nor political power but borders. In this framework, the paper aims to understand the locus and ‎spaces that are problematic for nation-state sovereignty and it is concerned with the political ‎status of groups of people that have challenged the juridical and political limits of nation-states. ‎It calls these people "stateless" and "non-state" people. These groups are not the topic of this paper but they offer the possibility to understand ‎the decline of nation-state sovereignty in the "post-Westphalian" order‏. The paper tries to trace the waning of sovereignty in this new global order and demonstrates that, ‎as nation-state sovereignty wanes, states and sovereignty come apart from one another. And ‎through this, we reach the concealed nomos of the political space within which we still live: "Boundary ‎Walls". ‎This paper shows that the nomos of the earth is defined by the Walls. It concludes that, the location of these vertical ‎structures is an anomic space. Further, it will be explained that such a structure taken to mark and ‎enforce an inside/outside distinction appears as a self-‎defeating paradox. Indeed, there is a struggle for anomic zone of suspension so that ‎we can think of a kind of Politics of Resistance. The agenda of the paper is thus to restart ‎from the structural facts, to measure the changes that have occurred and to ask once again what the role of ‎politics can contribute in this context

In the fourth subpart (namat) of Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt,Ibn Sīnᾱ tries to prove the existence of a particular being, named “Necessary Existent”. There he also explains the central role of this being in the world, His relation to other beings, and His attributes. It is in this very framework that he discusses other beings, that is, only to glorify the “Necessary Existent”. Ibn Sīnᾱ believes that the “Necessary Existent”is the cause of existence and makes things exist. In his ontology, the possible existents, i.e. everything except the necessary being, are considered to be “caused”. In view of this, in the fourth subpart of Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt as well, everything other than the “Necessary Existent” has been taken into consideration only as a caused thing or an effect.

In the recent decades, some people have tried to define ‘Islamic art’, but seemingly these efforts have not led to an obvious definition and explanation. In this article, we claim that it would be better to retreat and, before trying to make a definition of ‘Islamic art’, to philosophically analyze this concept. Then, by means of this method, we would clarify that, in order to be able to speak justifiably of ‘Islamic art’, about what fundamental problems we should determine our positions first; problems such as: “What is the meaning of ‘art’ in ‘Islamic art’?” “Does ‘art’ has the capacity to ascribe ‘Islamic’ to it?” “Which definition of art does ‘Islamic Art’ demand?” “What is the relation of ‘Islamic art’ to beauty?” Contemplation on these problems has, at least, this benefit that it makes clear the limits to be observed in order to speak of ‘Islamic art’ and to make a definition of it. Firstly, not every definition of art can be considered as a foundation, because according to some conceptions of art it may conflict with ‘being Islamic’. Secondly, ‘Islamic art’ must determine its position, specifically its ontological position, towards the concept of beauty: Is beauty the objective quality of things or their subjective quality? The critical problems here are that, on the one hand, accepting that beauty is subjective conflicts with the essential beauty of God in Islam; and, on the other hand, accepting that beauty is objective leads us to some theoretical difficulties. Therefore, the advocate of ‘Islamic art’ must overcome both problems. And thirdly, not any adjective can be ascribed to any noun, and there are some considerable limits as such. Therefore, such limits must be considered in ascribing ‘Islamic’ to ‘art’.