نشریه فلسفه تحلیلی
پیاپی 23 (بهار و تابستان 1392)

There is no doubt that Plotinus believes in the intuitive unification, butfor some reasons such as totality and limitless of One, interpretation ofcausality to emission, non acceptance reincarnation and unity, nonindependence of Persons, knowing the manifolds as image and ray, ofone can infer personal unity from his expressions and its reflection inhis theory about the knowledge f One. He, on the basis of various kindsof souls, emphasizes on the diverse stages of Knowledge. According toPlotinus the One is utterly unknowable both intuitively andintuitionally, and the only way to receive him is to transcend Intuitionwhich represents the duality of witness and witnessed. As a result in thestage which correspondence to mystical inexistence there is only onereality percept.

Dimension of the knowledge is considered as the most importanthuman dimension and, therefore, the investigation about the otherdimensions which are related to human’s understanding is as important.Nowadays, one of these dimensions considered by Psychologists andepistemologists is emotions dimension. Throughout the history ofthought, two general approaches can be observed about emotions.Some thinkers have always remarked of emotion’s negative role andhave shown its negative functions and have tried to remove it. Othersbelieve emotions are helpful to reason and knowledge .In this article,after introducing these two theories, we try to reread Mullasadra’s ideasabout the relationship of emotion to knowledge. On negative effects ofemotions and feelings in Mullasadra’s ideas, the effects of emotion inthe acceptance of imitative opinions, familiarity with materials and itsinfluence on knowledge, passions effect on soul imparity from divineknowledge, emotions role in defecting from favorable end, and feelingsaffection on wisdom are discussed. In positive role of feelings thevirtual and true loves have been dealt with

Tabataba’i has defined knowledge as the presence of one abstract inanother abstract. The first abstract which is the known has its existencein knowledge by presence and its essence in knowledge by aquintance.The second one is the very knower’s mind. Tabataba’i and hissuccessors have deduced some argument in order to demonstrateabstractedness of the two mentioned case. It seems that suchargumentation would be the first step in ontology of knowledge. Othersteps and themes are the realms of being, overlapping of these realms,unification of knower and known and that of knowing [world], andreduction of knowledge by acquaintance to knowledge by presence.

For explaining why "progress" in human sciences is not sensible likeprogress in natural sciences, there are two different approaches. In thefirst approach methodology of natural sciences is the same as themethodology of human sciences. But quality of one of them, i.e. humansciences is lower than another. Proponents of this approach believe thathuman sciences are not "science" in the same way that natural sciencesare. In the second approach, human sciences are "science" in the sameway that natural sciences are. But their quality is different and so theirmethodology is different. Neo-Kantians like Wilhelm Windelband,Heinrisch Rickert and Max Weber are proponents of second approach.In this essay, firstly, I briefly examine the difference between methodsof two sciences and dichotomy between "explanation" and"understanding". Secondly I describe Neo-Kantian approaches and byintroducing new dichotomy proposed by Rickert and Weber, I examineMax Weber's ideas in methodology in details. Finally I come toconclusion that Weber's approach for social science is comparable withsome scientists approach in natural science.

Naturalism is an approach to the world phenomena from perspective ofnatural sciences. This approach avoids any kind of a priori philosophy and, ingeneral, any alleged knowledge of what is supernatural. In ontology,epistemology and methodology, naturalism by no means relies onmetaphysics or any kind of knowledge beyond the framework of empiricalsciences neither on any method and criterion except scientific methodologyand criteria. Naturalism, in one of its readings, considers philosophy as abranch of empirical science or a field of enquiry within the framework of sucha science. Penelope Maddy’s works on naturalism, especially in philosophy ofmathematics which this thesis intends to expound, are the continuation ofQuine’s works. Quine, as a prominent naturalist philosopher, is thepropounder of effective and thorough theories regarding naturalism, realismand other relevant areas. Unlike the past philosophers and epistemologists, hedoes not seek any basis, for empirical sciences, stronger than science, so thathe always relies on findings of empirical sciences. Penelope Maddy startsfrom Quine’s naturalism and, in response to the questions posed by othernaturalists in philosophy of mathematics, looks for a fundamental method,emphasizing on the set theory as a crucial basis in her arguments. Maddybelieves that if a conflict arises between philosophical explanation andsuccessful mathematical practices, it is philosophy that should retreat from itsposition. Neither philosophy nor science can annul or change methodologicalprinciples of mathematics, both science and philosophy being metamathematicaltrials for mathematics. Maddy’s important achievement innaturalistic philosophy of mathematics is heterogeneous naturalism to whichhe referred as the Second Philosophy. She recommends only mathematicalmethods and issues, and believes that other disciplines are not in the positionto be able to criticize mathematics.

The subject of this article is about Classical Interpretation ofProbability and its Problems. For centuries, Classical Probability wasthe only prevalent approach in Probability theory. Because of someProblems and paradoxes in this theory, new interpretations wereintroduced by Philosophers and thinkers in the beginning of 20thcentury. In this article, we introduce the classical interpretation ofprobability from Philosophical–Historical approach and review itsproblems. We also review the frequency interpretation, logicalinterpretation and subjective interpretation as alternatives for classicalinterpretation.