نشریه فلسفه
سال چهل و نهم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

Immanuel Kant in Critique of the Power of Judgment has formulated logical function of the judgment of taste according to moments of quality, quantity, relation and modality. In explaining the quality of the judgment of taste, he introduces disinterested satisfaction and dissatisfaction as the object of the faculy of taste, and in this respect distinguishes the beautiful and its related judgment from the interested pleasure of the agreeable and the good. Despite the fact that Kant has explained the meaning of the interest in the field of practical criticism, he defines the interest as a satisfaction with “the existence of an object” in third critique. Such a definition denies any possibility of connection between satisfaction with the beautiful and faculty of desire. However, in §41 and §42 of third critique, he discusses the Possibility of “an empirical and intellectual interest in the beautiful”. The inclination to repeat the encounter with the artistic matter as well as the beauty of nature on the one hand and the feeling of disinterested satisfaction with the existence of the object on the other hand, creates an apparent contradiction in the relationship between interest and the beautiful. The present essay intends to eliminate or at least reveal the probable complexity of reading Kant's definition about interest and possibility of linking it with the beautiful in his aesthetics.

Hume’s view of spiritual substance and personal identity follows from his empiricist thesis concerning dependence of ideas on impressions, and his bundle theory of mind. Accordingly, he casts doubt upon the existence of mind or soul, traditionally regarded as the substratum or the bearer of perceptions; and consequently he faces with the problem of personal identity. He draws criticism at the criterion of the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of the past based on belief in spiritual substance as inadequate in producing the concept of personal identity. Yet, he maintains that the consciousness of the past and memory as the faculty of preserving the past perceptions facilitates the action of imagination to assume, perceive and discover the personal identity through relations of resemblance and causality. In the same vein, he claims that the personal identity is nothing more than the fiction of imagination, it is indemonstrable and has no criteria. What is significant about Hume’s approach to the problem of personal identity is that the approach is mainly epistemological rather than metaphysical. With respect to his empiricist approach and some of his assertions, this seems to be clear; however, it often remains unnoticed. This paper is an attempt to look at Hume’s view of personal identity from an epistemological viewpoint and show that he cannot be regarded as denying personal identity in the ontological terms; because according to his fundamental ideas, there are no possibilities for ontological discussion about personal identity.

Illocutionary acts are the most important and pivotal acts in the theory of speech acts. Any attempt to develop a taxonomy must take into account John Austin's classification of illocutionary acts into five basic categories of verdictive, expositive, exercitive, behabitive, and commissive. But for John Searle, Austin's taxonomy is not the classification of illocutionary acts, but the classifications of English illocutionary verbs. Thus Searle lists problems in Austin's classification, including: the existence of persistent confusion between the verbs and the acts, the existence of a great deal of overlap between categories, the existence of great heterogeneity within the categories, and so on. According to John Searle, it is better to consider the five categories of assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declaration as types of illocutionary acts. In his taxonomy of illocutionary acts, Searle also offers twelve different criteria and aspects of taxonomy, from which he chooses illocutionary point as the basis of his taxonomy and direction of fit and sincerity condition are corollaries it. But firstly, there is no complete taxonomy of speech acts, as Searle did, and basically cannot exist, and secondly, in Searle taxonomy, there is no precise explanation of the illocutionary point and corollaries of it. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is to critically examine Austin and Searle Taxonomies of illocutionary acts.

It is known that Ibn Sina Has mentioned three arguments to prove the necessary of existent, that is the argument from causality, from movement, and the argument from necessity and possibility. With a little reflection, it becomes clear that none of these arguments are Ibn Sina's innovative demonstration and are clearly stated in the works of Aristotle, Kindi and Farabi. What is Ibn Sina's original demonstration in proving the necessity of existence is the argument that is requisite for his philosophical system, that is, the demonstration based on the rational analysis of "existence" which can be called the Ibn Sinai demonstration. Ibn Sina, by rational analysis of existence as rational truth, proves the being of necessary existent and divine attributes and actions. Whereas in the above three proofs, with the presumption of possible existence, God is proved. In this article, we show with arguments and  the evidences that Ibn Sina's main and innovative argument is based on his theory about existence. Existence in Ibn Sina's thought is a metaphysical and a priori truth. contemplating on Ibn Sina's theory about existence makes it clear that his argument is not of Anselm and Descartes' argument and is not subject to Kant's criticism. On this basis, Ibn Sina is the first to present an existential argument that, while preceding philosophers such as Anselm, is also significantly different from them.

Suhrawardi believes that God is the agent of "satisfaction" (bel-Rez); According to this view, divine knowledge is the source of all beings in terms of the general system in the whole world, and the disabled person never has a separate identity from the identity of his science, and this dependence is the same as the relation to the cause. This article seeks to explain the role of the system of Suhrawardi concepts - that is, the rational divisions of the first and second - and "how to carry mental concepts on real matters" in a descriptive-analytical way in explaining Noor Al-Anwar's activity and then his philosophical view on Criticize the activity according to the principle of his thinking. The main question of the present study is whether Suhrawardi's view on the activity of Noor Al-Anwar is compatible with his statements about the system of intellects and its proposed rules or not? According to the results of this article, the lack of separation of secondary logical and philosophical concepts and intellects in Suhrawardi's philosophy and the criteria it provides for the validity of concepts and how they are carried over to real matters, seriously undermines the explanation of "divine knowledge". Therefore, Suhrawardi's view of activity in the pleasure of God can not have a convincing and correct explanation according to his philosophical system.

The mismatch between the mind and the outside is one of the challenging issues that many Philosophers do not accept, and most Philosophers may agree that what one perceives is In accordance with reality. Just as the matching of the worlds with each other seeks to prove the union between worthless existence and the superior existence, the matching of the mind and the object seeks to prove the union between the mind and the object. In this research, first, the theory of matching of worlds and matching of the object and the  mind and the problems of each of them are discussed in detail, among which are incorrect presuppositions such as knowing real Sensible things and not knowing real Invisible things or problems in dividing carriage into the first and common. And then the pillars of the theory of mismatch of mind and object are explained in detail in three sections, and finally the role of the theory of mismatch in the material world, example World, The world of wisdom and Singleness of divine world is examined. Among the results of the research are: 1- There is no evidence for the matching of the worlds and the matching of the mind and the object, but such the matching is impossible on the basis of the principle of existence. 2-The pillars of the theory of  mismatching are matters such as the relation of facts and beings to each other based on the principle of existence, not the matching of beings with each other, gradation of existence, existence of reality and being valuable of human perceptions. 3-The theory of mismatching of mind and object is proposed in relation to some types of present science.

There are three mainstreams in feminist philosophy of science: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodern epistemology. Sandra Harding as a feminist philosopher of science aims to integrate standpoint theory with postmodern tendencies. This tendency is apparent in her account about scientific pluralism. One can recognize two distinct routes in Harding’s arguments for scientific pluralism. First; she argues for some kind of scientific pluralism which is based on the concept of "strong objectivity" and second; she establishes an argument in favor of a "world of sciences" which reflects post-modern concerns. The strong objectivity argument relies on standpoint theory of knowledge. It assumed that the perspectives of marginal groups can produce less distorted accounts about nature and social relations. On the other hand, the concept of the world of sciences is affected by Harding’s postmodern tendencies; according to which there is a co-constitutive relation between science and society. Harding applies both approaches in favor of scientific pluralism, but these two arguments lead to two different types of scientific pluralism. This disparity is the result of the conflicts between standpoint theory of knowledge and postmodern epistemology. In the following paper non-coherent implications of Harding’s scientific pluralism is discussed in two cases: the problem of “Realism/Anti-Realism” and the style of “social interactions in scientific community”.

In this article, the view of contemporary Neo-Sadraists on the compatibility of the theory “Body composed of matter and form” with the theory “Body composed of parts” is studied. For this purpose, in the introduction, by pointing out that Greece is the origin of the issue of matter and form, and that Aristotle considers the body to be composed of matter and form, we express the view of Democritus, who considers the body to be composed of indivisible components. Further, we mention the views of Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Hadi Sabzevari, who refute the composition of the body from the parts, and then we will express the views of contemporary Neo-Sadraists such as Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei, Morteza Motahhari and Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi in this regard and clarify the differences between their views and those of previous philosophers and then, as the opinions are summarized, we conclude the compatibility of the theory “Body composed of matter and form” with the theory “Body composed of parts” from the perspective of contemporary Neo-Sadraists. This article indicates the development of the issues related to matter and form in Islamic philosophy and its gradual evolution and the opening of new horizons in the analysis of issues and is considered a contemporary philosophical achievement.

Husserl belived that “Ego” of “selfn is center of every act of cohsciousness specially cognition. According to his thought in every act of consciousness in the one hand Ego- pole and a on the other hand object- pole existed. Ego is self- identical subject that agent in every equal process of consciousness act. Therefore, is unique base of all act of awareness. Namely, is center of all influence and impressible, percepts, pleasure pain or every condition of extant on consciousness. but, in spite of Following of husserl, contrasted with Husserlian concept of Ego and criticized thus “self” that Husserl bring up and suppose it Transcendental, For Sartre, Ego not only organized by abstractly pre condition that modulated by transcendental subject but, Ego was out of transcendental affair on the real world and by his Freedom and free will trait that indicat of Existential Feature, it had transcendental. Nevertheless assonant by Husserl, belive that “intentionality” basis of every awarness act of “Ego”. We try on this research analysis Husserlian Ego and checked critique of Sartre on Husserl.

Form is among the most widely used and primary concepts in architecture that has gone through a revolution through time. It is used in every architecture design method and every style, yet its characteristics are not well understood. Despite many studies in architecture design method of generating form, it fails to consider the concept and meaning of form that raises questions in the meaning of the architecture itself. Therefore, this paper aims to gain the meaning of form in morphogenetic architecture design within the framework of its theory to answer the question of the meaning of form and its origins are. By using the qualitative research method, the attention was focused on the concept of form in morphogenetic architecture and what was said to be its origins (natural sciences). What this method shared was that in digital morphogenesis architecture the concept of form gets its meaning from natural sciences specially biology despite the fact that the concept of form in biology has its roots in Aristotle’s philosophy. Taken together, these findings suggest that the origin of Form in morphogenetic architecture is of Aristotle’s notion hylomorphism origins and there is a direct relation between these two that surprisingly is ignored in architecture studies.

The relationship between modality and time is a complex one; Aristotle's arguments about determinism are mainly focused on time rather than causation. The problem of De Interpretatione can be attributed to Aristotle's considerations on time and truth. From Aristotle's emphasis on the "necessity of something when it is the case (ὑπάρχειν)" and explaining it in the form of the negation of absolute necessity, at least three conclusions can be drawn: 1. The introduction of time into modalities and finally the evolution of The discussion on determinism and singular future events. 2. The importance of the consequences of Aristotle's theory of truth in denying or demanding the determinism based on the relation of truth and time. 3. Aristotle's fundamental distinction between conditional and absolute necessity, which leads to a better understanding of the various spheres of existence and knowledge, including the differences between monde sublunaire and monde supralunaire. The inference of necessity from the truth of one thing shows that just as truth in Aristotle's standpoint depends on correspondence with facts, so the concept of necessity must be understood as a description of reality. The connection between truth, necessity, and actuality suggests that it is not easy to regard unrealized reality of future as the realm of truth, apriori necessity and strict determinism. The aim of this paper is to clarify the boundaries of Aristotle's thought about necessity with determinism and causal determinism in the main question of the article and to seek the necessary evidence to prove this difference in the discussions of the ninth chapter of De Interpretatione.

Preparatory cause or the preparator is known in Islamic philosophy as an unreal cause on which the existence of the effect is not dependent, rather, it prepares the ground for the appearance of the effect. The nature and characteristics of the preparatory cause are not quite clear, as Muslim philosophers have addressed it very briefly and intermittently, rather than thoroughly and systematically. Consulting the primary sources of the Islamic philosophy, this article tries to provide a systematized account of the subject, in which the role of preparatory cause in the genesis of material beings is explained. According to the findings of this research, the preparator, as commonly understood, prepares the way for the emergence of the effect through making the matter prepared to take on a new form. Despite the differences between preparatory and real causes, such as the necessity of simultaneity and homogeneity between cause and effect in the latter and the unnecessity of these characteristics in the former, the emergence of any natural being is inevitably contingent on a prior process of preparation. Without this process of preparation, no material thing is preferred for turning into a new thing. This means that creating without the prior preparation amounts to preferring without any preference. Knowing that the nature of preparation is moving the matter toward the dispositional contingency, preparators are to be either material or souls that are in some relation to matter.