نشریه مطالعات حقوقی فضای مجازی
سال دوم شماره 1 (پیاپی 5، بهار 1402)

Some of the criminal examples in the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, according to the thought approach that governs the policy-making procedure an leads it in the direction of differentiating the crimes, have been brought to the attention of the legislators in such a way that, while emphasizing the maintenance of public order, it also affects maintenance of the order of military units. In other words, in some cases, if there is no emphasis on dealing with it, military crimes can cause disturbances in public order, which include traditional espionage and computer espionage. The research methodology in this study is descriptive-analytical through library and survey studies. In the criminal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in addition to the Law on Punishment of Armed Forces Crimes approved in 2003, the Law on Computer Crimes approved in 2009 also covers the commission of computer espionage by military personnel. The findings of the present research indicate that in the Criminal Law of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the perpetrator of the crime of traditional espionage and computer espionage can be a military person or a civilian. The criminal policy governing the crime of espionage in the Criminal Law of the Armed Forces approved in 2012 is a strict criminal policy.

In the process of evolution from thought to criminal action, what happens to a cyber-criminal in his/her initial or continuous desire to commit a crime is the strong criminal tendency and the lack or, in some case,s weakness of the deterrents that cause him not to join the society. This gradual process, which concentrates on risk components in different age periods based on three basic components including learning patterns and learned lessons, suppressed childhood experiences and memories and finally the lack of family and social bonds, will be studied in this paper. Therefore, the present research, employing causality perspective, explains how the social forces (family, friends, culture, environmental conditions, poverty, etc.) can be effective in creating a criminal identity? An approach that aims to achieve practical results tested a range of variables in the light of theoretical criminological foundations on the statistical population of cyber-criminals to be able to achieve a causal cognitive model based on the most important factors influencing their criminal course. Variables that often cause the appearance, continuity and stability of cybercrimes are acquired and learned and that the human nature (inheritance) play insignificant role the formation of cyber crimes. Hence, the current research, which is a collective and phenomenological research, is descriptive-analytical in terms of its nature and method, and in terms of purpose is practical. The statistical population of this research consists of a group of convicts of Great Tehran Prison (Fashafouye) who are serving their sentence in the said prison. The findings describe the fact that the propensity for cybercrime and movement towards it is not a single event but a product of a gradual and staggered process. It is worth mentioning that the statistical calculations were done using SPSS22 software and based on descriptive-inferential statistics (by applying the multivariate regression equation method).

Prevention of security breaches today depends on understanding the concepts and examples of cyber security breaches as well as appropriate examination of the measures applied by governments in adopting preventive criminal policies. This is a relatively new issue but important one in thatit constitutes the most important component in expressing the desired governance of countries. Furthermore, as the evidence show, the cyberspace is the target of complex security-violating actions it has induced the governments both in the domestic and international arenas to apply efficient and effective approaches and guidelines of active and comprehensive preventive criminal policies and to seek suitable solutions against the cyber security breaches. The present article follows descriptive-analytical methodology inanalysing the situational preventive approaches of Iran against cyber security violations as stipulated under laws and legal documents as well as the international instruemts. It seems that, despite the fact that the legal system has taken different cyber security approaches in situational prevention of the cyber breaches but, the criminal policies of Iran, in spite of the attempts at strengthening of the cyber security foundations, lacks the differentiation bases and have not been successful in adopting centralized and effiient policies in preventing the cyber space breaches

Cyber-attacks, while as easy as pushing a button, can have devastating and possibly catastrophic consequences such as the destruction, disabling or malfunctioning of critical infrastructure. Such an inevitable action certainly has to be timely and appropriately responded by the affected states. Although the issue of international responsibility of states, as a broad concept of cyber-attacks, faces many challenges, assuming that the aggrieved State is able to identify the source of the cyber-attack and also able to attribute the same to a country, the question that arises is: what legal solutions exist for the aggrieved government in order to respond appropriately and realize its right. In this article, which has employed library studies and analytical and descriptive methodology, we intend to examine the types of possible responses to cyber-attacks by the aggrieved governments and the conditions for using each of the possible responses.

The global interconnectedness created through information technology provides a potentially powerful weapon for states and non-state actors to remotely disable or destroy military defense networks. Sending excessive data requests to an internet website, "server or router" can be used as a weapon to destroy major information networks or to infiltrate private networks. The present study, employing descriptive-analytical methods, investigates the possibility of applying the Principle of Non-recourse to Force as an absolute rule of international law in relation to cyber-attacks and existing legal challenges. The questions that arise are: can the cyber attacks be prohibited according to the Principle of Non-recourse to Force in the light of the Article 4 of the Paragraph 4 of the Charter? If so, can the cyber attack allow the use of military in legitimate defence as per the Article 51 of the charter? The findings show that although cyber-attacks may not cause physical damage, and in other words, they do not violate Article 2, Clause 4 of the Charter but, the principle of non-intervention, as a powerful international legal tool, can be used by states to protect and counter cyber-attacks

Hostile actions and resorting to coercive force in the cyberspace fields are very important issues that could challenge fundamental principles of the international law. Many States consider the cyberspace as a battlefield and intend to inflict damages through it to their opponent states. United States is considered an avant-garde in these issues. The United States possess many advanced technologies in cyberspace field. In this respect, the necessity of self-defense (legitime defense) against cyber-attacks seems inevitable, although from “treaty law” point of view it lacks the basic internationally supported legislations. It remains to be clarified whether the 51th Article of the United Nations Charter could be used as a legal base for cyber self-defense or not and if that could be entitled self-defense or not. This study employs descriptive-analytical method through data analyzing system. Findings of this study indicate that in the event of a cyber-attack by a State or its agents, a cyber-self-defense could be legally justifiable provided that the legal conditions of the self-defense such as compatibility of self-defense with the attacks and some other international law principles (principle of non-use of force for example) are met, Of course, in the path of self-defense, the principle of proportionality must be observed as the main rule, and as soon as the Security Council effectively intervenes in the crisis, the defense must be terminated.