نشریه متافیزیک
سال ششم شماره 1 (پیاپی 17، بهار و تابستان 1393)

The issue of private language entered in the scope of philosophy by Wittgenstein. In his important book، Philosophical Investigations (1953)، he argues that the private language is impossible. According to him، the pervious systems of philosophy like Rationalism، Empiricism، Idealism and even Logical Atomism explain the raise of knowledge so that it entails private language. Private language، Wittgenstein defines، is a language whose individual words refer to what can only be known to the speaking person and imply his immediate private sensations. Thus، another person cannot understand the language. This language is، according to Wittgenstein، impossible because it leads to epistemological and semantic skepticism. The definition of private language contains two elements: the “privacy” and “referring to”. Wittgenstein shows how we may be trapped in solipsism and the only way to avoid this problem is to consider language as a social phenomenon.

Richard McKay Rorty (1932-2007) is the American neo-pragmatist. Criticizing the prevalent issues of traditional philosophy such as truth، knowledge، objectivity، logic and philosophy، he considers epistemology a modern subject which emerged via forging the mind by Rene Descartes. In his view، separation of mind–body is an unprecedented matter created in Descartes philosophy. He thinks that، in creating such a matter، Descartes was aided by the big and strong image of human mind as a large mirror which reflects the world. Rorty states that this image is not trustable. This study investigates the view of Rorty about mind and body. The main hypothesis of this study is that Rorty does not seek solution for selecting monism or dualism or other view، and thus he prefers the annulling approach to solving approach.

One of the most controversial issues in Heidegger’s philosophy is his claim that western philosophy tradition has overlooked the issue of Being. Heidegger’s attempt is to reveal the origins of this negligence by means of destruction. However، it seems that through such claim Heidegger aims to destroy and disvalue this tradition. In addition to defining and explaining destruction، our purpose in this article is to show that Heidegger’s goal is not to destroy the tradition of philosophy but the term destruction refers to a process which is a step in Heidegger’s phenomenology by means of which one can conceive and perceive Being better because only through such destruction ontology can fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts. The necessity of doing destruction in Heidegger’s thought has also been discussed and his persistence on it has been shown in two of his works، one belongs to early and another to later Heidegger.

Some analytic philosophers have argued that in order to have a genuine distinction the border line should have a completely a priori specified place. This condition has been suggested by some philosophers (e. g. Putnam) to argue that the sharp line between observational terms and theoretical terms is completely “broken-back” since the line is not fixed. This camp، which we label anti-dichotomists، have tried to show that arbitrarily-drawn boundaries do not have any benefit، so it is absurd to add them to our conceptual frameworks. On the other hand، dichotomists believe that although each person can draw this boundary in a different place، it finally exists somewhere and can perform a wide variety of tasks. In this paper، first، we argue even if a distinction cannot be sharply drawn، one cannot conclude that the problem، for its solution the distinction was proposed، is not a genuine problem. The border is useful when and only when it serves some purposes. Second، by appealing to some of Van Fraassen’s insights، namely the “aim of science”، we shall argue that this distinction serves some purposes and thus it is wise to stick to it. In general، it does not matter that a border is fixed or not، it just matters if it matters or not.

There are two rival accounts about belief in the literature of philosophy، one is the teleological account and the other is the normative account. Defenders of the teleological account and most defenders of the normative one typically take the accounts as interpretations of Bernard Williams''s slogan. The slogan holds that ''belief aims at truth''. In this paper، I will first clarify the teleological and normative accounts of belief. I will also argue that the teleological account and versions of the normative account taken as interpretation of Williams''s slogan are implausible for they neither can give sense to some intrinsic features of belief nor can give sense to some well-known philosophical principles in the literature. On the basis of my arguments against the teleological and normative accounts، I will end by proposing some evidence against Williams''s slogan.

Articulating his philosophical aims، Nietzsche has exploited animal similes and metaphors (i. e. fables، in a more technical term). It should be noted that he has not stepped on this style with the mere intention of splurge or embellishing his work with tropes but، instead، has reflected upon ''animality'' or ''being animal'' of human being. However، he considers the animality of humankind as different from the Aristotelian notion of ''rational animal''. Based on the notion of animality in its biological sense، he puts forward a project through which human existence can be linked to Nature. Furthermore، on the basis of the notion of ''animality'' borrowed from Nature، he tries to re-define humanity and also restitute its true authentic meaning; that is، to naturalise its correlative values. Explaining animality and specifying its place within the Nietzschean system of thought، this paper aims to set forth the animality of humankind in a different way.

Friedrich Nietzsche، one of the most influential and thoughtful philosopher in the 19th century، in an attempt to reassess values، finds himself in confrontation with accepted ideas of the modern world. Therefore، in his critical review، in order to reform and revive the modern civilization and culture، he writes his first book، i. e. The Birth of Tragedy. His various intentions in this book are as following: a) cultural concerns and saving the culture of his age from nihilism and the danger of falling apart، b) reassessing values، c) showing the opposition of Christianity and conceptual philosophy of Socrates with the nature of life، Dionysus element as well as the desire to live، d) aesthetic interpretation of living and being and e) viewing life from the perspective of art. Nietzsche considers the last two cases as the special features of Greek''s tragic art and praises Greek''s tragic age for such perspective. He admires ancient Greeks as well as their culture and thought because they are the creators of tragic art and through such creation as well as by considering Dionysus element they accepted life with all of its good and bad aspects. Nietzsche discusses two fundamental concepts of birth and death of tragedy as well. However، he views the birth and death of tragedy in two different ways; a) in a particular age، Greek tragedy emerged from Greek culture and became an influential factor in the development of that nation’s culture but died later on، b) Nietzsche''s hope in the re-emergence of Greek tragic art in the modern world lies in Wagner''s music which died، too. In his view، the factors behind the death of tragedy are as following: the Socrates'' conceptual philosophy and Euripides'' plays، Christianity and ethicality as well as modern dialectic and Wagner himself. This article، first، tries to study Nietzsche’s important intentions in writing The Birth of Tragedy and explain such birth in the first sense emphasizing the interpretation of its origin and constituents. In addition، this research attempts to indicate، from the viewpoint of Nietzsche، why and how tragedy died.