نشریه حکمت صدرایی
سال سوم شماره 1 (پیاپی 5، پاییز و زمستان 1393)

The present paper aims to compare Allameh Tabatabaei''s view on the issue of secondary intelligibles with Suhrawardi''s. For this purpose، after describing the views of Suhrawardi and Allameh Tabatabaei on the definition and classification of objective and subjective concepts، how these concepts exist outside and inside mind، the criterion of truth، comparison of the two concepts، manifestations of subjective concepts، etc.، their views on the above issues are compared. The topics discussed in this paper reveal that both philosophers have achieved an understanding of subjective concepts and distinguish them from objective ones. However، Suhrawardi has not made any distinction between different kinds of subjective concepts and has mentioned philosophical and logical concepts on the same plane. As a result، he has founded logical convictions upon philosophical concepts; Allameh، however، makes division between secondary intelligibles and places philosophical and logical concepts in two separate groups; As such، he makes distinctions between their convictions.

“Celestial metempsychosis” is transferring the soul from physical body to the other-worldly one according to moral attributes and their manifestation in the afterlife. On the basis of some Transcendent Philosophy’s principles like primacy of existence، substantial motion، gradation of being، union between the intellect and the intelligible as well as the bases of his philosophical anthropology، Mulla sadra argued for “celestial metempsychosis”. relying on rational arguments as well as Quranic verses and prophetic traditions، he proved that one’s beliefs and free acts cause transformation of their soul and construction of a new forma individualis in human being so that he will transfer to the other world with the very acquired forma individualis. In Mulla Sadra’s view، this sort of intrinsic transformation is the very theory of bodily resurrection and embodiment of the deeds derived from scripture which is authenticated by wisdom and revelation as well as intuition. In this research، after elucidating the concept of “celestial metempsychosis” and its difference with corporeal one، I will examine the intellectual bases of celestial metempsychosis and embodiment of deeds based on philosophical and interpretive works of Mulla Sadra.

The ways of achieving knowledge and knowing its obstacles are the most important concerns of scholars like Mulla Sadra، as an Eastern Philosopher، and Francis Bacon، as a Western thinker. According to Mulla Sadra the basis of true knowledge is having faith to God and achieving it through intuition. Also، he considers this knowledge as the key for other sciences and accounts three main obstacles on the way of gaining it. On the other hand، Bacon believes in the necessity of knowing nature for achieving the knowledge of God، and as such considers the mental errors and wrong beliefs as important obstacles on the way of acquiring knowledge. He introduces four so-called idols in this respect. Although the two philosophers belong to two different intellectual systems، there exist similar concerns in their thoughts. So، the writers of this paper are trying to compare their ideas and recognize the similar factors in their thoughts، and through a descriptive-analytic method come to this conclusion that the concept of knowledge and its obstacles are equivocal rather than univocal in their thoughts. Because in Mullasadra''s view، the true meaning of knowledge is to know God and His attributes، but according to Bacon knowledge means empirical cognition. In addition، for Mullasadra the obstacles of knowledge are rather referring to religious fields، while for Bacon there is no religious limitation for them.

Mulla Sadrā''s view about the ideality of quiddity is interpreted in various، even contradicting، forms. Allamah Tabatabaii’s and Ayatollah Fayazi''s views on explaining the ideality of quiddity are among the most important interpretations of Mulla Sadra’s theory. Allamah Tabatabaii has rejected any external existence of quiddity and has considered it as a mental mirage of reality; whereas Ayatollah Fayazi believes that the ideal quiddity exists externally as well. Ayatollah fayazi holds the belief that attribution of existence to the existing quiddity is an “actual attribution“. However، it seems to me that none of the above-mentioned interpretations have explained Mulla Sadrā''s theory correctly. What can be inferred from Mulla Sadra’s works is that quiddity is not externally non-existent and possesses a kind of existence. It is، however، different from the existence of quiddity. For specific reasons، he argues that the term “existent” cannot be used for the existence of quiddity، and has considered this kind of existence as affirmation of thingness. In this paper، Allamah Tabatabaii and Ayatollah Fayazi''s interpretations of Mulla Sadra’s view as well as mine are discussed at first، and then some of the consequences of such a debate for Mulla Sadra’s philosophy are presented.

The nature of sublimated God is “non-conditional as the source of division” from the perspective of Transcendent Philosophy، that is the existence and the existent are restricted to a same referent. In this view، the meaning of the causality، is expressed as manifestation and evolution of something in his nature and it results in the appearance of the Cause’s Infinite perfections. So، multiplicity is nothing but manifestations of God’s nature. For the sake of connecting the diversity and the unity، Mulla Sadra suggested the expanded grace. According to him، the appearance of plurality from the unity is، in principle، the appearance of a divine face whose plurality is His unity. The significance of expanded grace in Transcendent philosophy is equivalent to that of early mystics. In his view، all manifestations of God such as first individuation and second individuation، whether briefly or at length، are in the realm of compassionate breath.

Mulla Sadra has been accused of electing two different conceptual schemes of philosophy and mysticism. However، it can be said that he reconstructed and redefined fundamental philosophical concepts in light of mystical doctrines. In this view، he replaced gradation of being with gradation of manifestations of Being and instauration with theophany and the two part distinction with all-embracing one. Moreover، with a reconsideration of matter and form، he reduced substantial motion in being to substantial motion in manifestations. Thus، the intellectual stage is the manifestation of divine stage and the imaginal stage is the manifestation of intellectual one and finally the material world is the manifestation of imaginal one. In this context، motion which is gradual going out of potentiality to actuality means gradual exodus of exoteric to esoteric thing.

The concern of attaining the moral truth and action was important for Mulla Sadra. The goal of this article is to investigate and evaluate the correspondence between his ethical theory and the contemporary Virtue Ethics. The analysis of the features of Virtue Ethics on the one hand and exploring Mulla Sadra’s ethical theory on the other، demonstrates that Virtue Ethics is dominant in his moral paradigms. In this paper، amongst the pieces of evidence which are accessible in his works، I have considered some factors that work as an argument for Virtue Ethics. First، like other virtue ethicists، Mulla Sadra considers virtue as the ultimate goal of human being. Secondly، he emphasizes “being” rather than mere activity. Thirdly، according to him، virtue is worthy in itself. Besides، he does not restrict the ethical life to the mere rational rules. For him، the moral exemplars are the true models for a virtuous life. Furthermore، it is necessary for achieving an ethical life to develop virtues both in mental states and in corporal actions.

According to a strong version of the theory of «mental existence»، this theory includes three main cl 1. Perception implies the existence of an idea in the mind of the subject; 2. the reality of the perception is nothing but the mental idea and 3. this mental idea corresponds the external perceived object. In this paper، I shall examine an interpretation of Sadra''s view which accepts the first claim while rejecting the second. This interpretation، presented by Javadi Amoli، draws a distinction between the existence of perception and the mental existence of the perceived object. Before this examination، I explore two similar views proposed before Mulla Sadra by Fakhr al-Din Al-Razi and al-Qushchi. Fakhr al-Din Al-Razi، though believing in the mental ideas، thinks that the reality of perception consists in the relation between the mind and the external world. According to Qushchi، the reality of the perception is an immanent entity in the mind which is different from what possesses the mental existence. The final conclusion of this paper is that all these three views encounter serious philosophical challenges.

In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy، after the soul is proved، it is argued that it must be abstract and immaterial. However، considering the abstract soul، it should be answered whether Mulla Sadra is dualistic or monistic? In this study، based on Sadra’s principles، it will become clear that the human being is a single reality from sperm to his last stages of abstractness، and various respects and stages is abstracted from it and then the concept of soul and body is obtained from those various respects and stages without being any exact and specific boundaries among them. The principle of substantial movement and essential evolution as well as existential unity enables Sadra to explain these concepts. He also uses the conceptual model of principle of the unity of matter and form (potentiality and actuality) and then considers the man as a reality that has two aspects of actuality and potentiality (soul and body).