shamsullah siraj

This paper seeks to discuss the issue of the infallibility of the prophets from the perspective of Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa'i, one of the great Imami thinkers. Creating harmony between the three theological, philosophical and mystical approaches, Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa'i (838-912AH), as a person who has an important status in merging different theoretical branches in the shadow of Imami teachings, has proved the infallibility of the prophet based on his collectivist view of epistemic sources. Presenting a commentary on the theory of divine Grace from a theological point of view, taking benefit of the theory of divine Providence with a philosophical approach and finally, paying attention to the status of the caliphatehood of the perfect man and the concept of moderation in Islamic mysticism, he has proved the necessity and the scope of the infallibility of the Prophet. In addition to his emphasis on the apparent position of the prophet and the position of mission, one of the advantages of his view over his predecessors is that he has dealt with the issue of infallibility from the perspective of the inner position of the prophet in the universe and the necessity of his existence (perfect man).

According to the analysis of quantified propositions in modern logic, many of the rules pertaining to propositions in classic logic will be considered as invalid. Many of these rules are related to deducing a particular proposition from a universal proposition or universal propositions. They include direct argumentations such as subaltern, simple conversion, conversion by contradiction (contraposition), square of oppositions and [indirect argumentations] such as some modes of the third and fourth forms of conjunctive syllogism. The present article tries to study one of Suhrawardi’s logical innovations, that is, the reduction of a particular proposition to a universal one through supposition, which serves as a solution to the aforementioned problem. It seems that his innovative solution solves all the mentioned problems except the problem of contrast. The question of the invalidity of contradiction, however, emerges as a new problem.