جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « فودور » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Intentionality is one of the main characteristics of mental states based on which mental states are related to objects. Hence, one of the issues of the philosophy of mind is to explain this feature.  The present article examines two relevant aspects of this subject, namely, the possibility of intentionality and how to determine mental content. In the first aspect, we explain the possibility of intentionality based on the doctrine of physicalism, and then we talk about how the mental content is determined, which is the semantic feature of intentionality. According to causal theories, its content and method of referring to the outside of the mind and brain are determined by the causal cause or circumstances of its creator. Thus, mental representations i.e. our thoughts have meaning in terms of the causal relationship between them and the part of the world they refer to, and in this way, a natural and physical explanation can be given in terms of intent and content. In this article, after stating the foundations of this theory, namely intentional realism, and naturalism, we discuss and evaluate the two main interpretations of causal theories, namely Fodor's asymmetric dependence and Dal Dretske's semantics. The most important drawbacks of causal theories in both interpretations are the inability to explain the content and meaning of logical and philosophical concepts, as well as non-existent concepts, systematic error, and future beliefs. Fodor's interpretation is ambiguous in the delivery of information, and Dretske's interpretation of the analogy between our knowledge and beliefs with the causal circumstances that give rise to them is problematic. Consequently, both interpretations are incomplete.

In this article, I examine Fodor's modal argument for individualism and for narrow content. Fodor's modal argument wants to show that my twin-earth and I have thoughts with the very same causal powers; XYZ-thoughts and water-thoughts are not different causal powers with respect to water- behaviors and XYZ-behaviors. If this is so, Fodor argues, then my twin and I do not differ in any psychological state, and individualism is true. Fodor examine his argument by “no-conceptual-connection test” or “New Logical Connections Argument”. Therefore To see whether causal powers are the different, there must be the no-conceptual connections between cause-properties and effect-properties. Fodor argues that the difference between my water-thoughts causing his intentional water-drinking behavior and my twin's XYZ-thoughts causing his XYZ-drinking is a conceptual difference. Hence, the water/XYZ thoughts are not different causal powers. finally, I show that Fodor’s version of the New Logical Connections argument or Fodor’s no-conceptual-connection test don’t work. If this is so, Then Fodor's defense of narrow content and individualism does not sufficient.

Massive Modularity Hypothesis of Mind assumes that the mind is composed largely, or perhaps even entirely, of modules. Since the publication of Modularity of the Mind (Fodor, 1983) modularity has occupied a central role in the studies of mind and cognitive science. But in philosophy there is no agreement about this role. In this paper, first I propose that many of these problems are the effects of the Fodorian base of Massive Modularity Hypothesis, and then I suggest taking Simon’s works on complexity as a proper base for modularity. In the last section of this paper, I consider two common characteristics of mind, i.e. domain- specificity and encapsulation, and argue that in shadow of Massive Modularity Hypothesis these characteristics can be explained better.

The view that one''s observations are depended on his/her epistemological network and are flexible due to trainings and expectations، is a long-lasting view which has a special place in the philosophy of science. The opposite view says that there is an impenetrable layer in observation which is resistant to influence of any educational and epistemological structure. In this paper، we first present these views according to Churchland and Fodor، the main figures in the camps respectively. Second، more importantly، we will defend a more moderate view which is based on a graded account of observation. The latter view accepts rigidity in the level of sensation while acknowledges that observation is flexible in higher levels. According to this view there is no need to appeal to flexibility of sensations to explain why there are discrepancies in observational reports and judgments.