The conditioned obligatory and separation between creative proposition (Ensha) and content of what is created (Monsha)

One of the objections about theory of conditioned obligatory is that: this theory is required separation between creative proposition (Ensha) and content of what is created (Monsha). Impossibility of separation between creative proposition (Ensha) and content of what is created (Monsha) is referring to Impossibility of separation between creation and existence, or between cause and effect, or between credit to and what is credited. Many of researchers reply to this objection. This article came under scrutiny replies of researchers Khorasani, Esfahani, Eraqi, Naeini and Khouie and criticizes them. In the first era (the objection of separation between creation and existence) it is argued that the reply of the researcher Khorasani that explain by the researcher Esfahani is accepted true. According to this view it is difference between real actuate (ba’th) and virtual actuate. It seems the theory of conditioned obligatory does not require separation between cause and effect or between credit to and what is credited.