Gödel's Ontological Argument

In 1970، Gödel showed his ontological argument to Dana Scott and discussed it with him. Afterwards، Scott presented a slightly different version of the argument at Princeton University. The logical system of the argument is a second-order quantified S5-modal logic with identity and an abstraction operator. Granted the acceptability of the underlying logical system، Gödel’s conclusion that necessarily there exists a God-like being)) can be derived from the premises-with Gödel and Scott on the scene، who can say otherwise? Sobel، however، proved that the system faces modal collapse-i. e. P↔□P is derivable from the system. Responding to Sobel، Anderson tried to block this by weakening some axioms and definitions. In this paper، I will be trying to consider Gödel’s ontological argument (Scott’s version) from a logical point of view، along with Sobel’s criticism and Anderson’s emendations.