Allamah Tabatabaii on the Compatibility of the Causal Necessity and the Human Freedom

There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism، which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom، and incompatibilism، which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii proposes a specific version of compatibilism based on the notion of “comparative contingency” (al-imkan al-bilqiyas). According to his theory، the principle of causal necessity does not require more than that the human free action possess comparative contingency in comparison with the human agent and comparative necessity in comparison with its complex perfect cause (al-illah al-tammah). Moreover، the very nature of the human freedom is nothing but the action’s being contingent in relation to his agent. Therefore، the causal comparative necessity of the action in relation to its complex perfect cause does not contradict its being free. This compatibilist view has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers. In this paper we first give a short explication of Tbatabaii’s theory and then examine the arguments of its critics.