Self-evidence of Moral Propositions in Islamic Thought

Some moral propositions are self-evident and are used as basis for justifying theoretical ones in ethics. While this view has long been raised in Islamic thought and explained in more detail by contemporary philosophers, the sort of their being self-evident is less explained and sometimes is subject to disagreement. The authors of the present article hold that at least two propositions of “justice is right” and “injustice is wrong” are primary self-evident. Whether they are analytic or synthetic, that the predicates can be essentially attributed to the subjects or need to be reasoned as in any so-called ḥml Shāyʿ(common predication) is the matter of dispute among scholars. They also argue over the question whether such qualities as rightness and wrongness are essential characteristics of justice and injustice or something concomitant with them. Again they do not have the same account of the concept of “essential” when attributed to the subjects concerned. Such propositions are self-evident not in virtue of being among primary concepts but because they are the intuitive propositions. Therefore, we can recognize some instances of right and wrong through presential knowledge.