Ana Analysis of the role of Ontological Principles in Tabatabaʾei's Various Formulations of the Siddiqin Argument

With an analysis of the considerations (iʾtibārāt) of the existence in order to achieve a correct understanding of the necessary being (wājib al-wujūd), we will show that of these considerations, only the dividum version of the existence-as-non-conditionally-being-something (lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī) can apply to God. To understand Sayyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaʾei's conception of the necessary being and due to the importance of his formulation of the Siddīqīn Argument, we will investigate his ontological principles, showing that he prefers the personal unity (al-waḥda al-shakhṣiyya) of existence, which amounts to the dividum version of the existence-as-nonconditionally-being-something. This is shown by his formulation of the two important philosophical principles of "ṣirf al-shayʾ" (the mere entity) and "basiṭ al-ḥaqiqa" (simple reality). We find two formulations of the Siddīqīn argument in Tabatabaʾei's work. Not recognizing these two formulations has led to different approaches to this argument even among his pupils.