Realism and the Challenge of Moral Dilemmas

Bernard Williams appeals to phenomenology of moral dilemmas to provide arguments against moral cognitivism and realism. In two of his papers, "Ethical Consistency" and "Realism and Consistency" he attempts to show that moral judgments have some features in common with desires and, regarding these features, they are different from purely descriptive assertions. So he argues that (i) there are moral dilemmas that we have no way to put one of the alternative's aside, though realists maintain that we can and have to do so, and (ii) there are moral dilemmas that though we may find support for one of the alternative, yet we experience some kind of regret about the abandoned one, a feeling that is both moral and rational. However, it seems that these objections could be met by having in mind our epistemic limits, using Ross's ethical theory, and providing an externalist desire-based account compatible with a realist outlook. I think that realist can defend his/her position, though can learn from these objections and become a more modest realist.