MullaSadra and Tabatabaei's Different Interpretations on " Quiddity" and its Effect on the Evidence of " Principality of Being Theory"

This paper intends to find an answer to the problematic description of “quiddity” in MullaSadra and Tabatabaei’s philosophy and to consider its effect on evidence of “Principality of Existence Theory”. There are two interpretations of quiddity in MullaSadra’s philosophy; but actual realization of existence (by itself) and quiddity (by accident) which has more consistency to MullaSadra’s philosophical structure. In Tabatabaei’s philosophy, however, “reality” is “existence” and quiddity (as known) has no actual realization. Quiddity is apparition of essential negations and limitations of existence in the mind; therefore concrete equivalent of quiddity is such negations which are considered as the arbitrary and non-existence related to something. Moreover, by the both interpretations on quiddity, Principality of Existence will be regarded as a self-evident theory and the arguments will be for indicating. But Tabatabaei’s view is more qualified and in his philosophy “existence is principal” is an analytical proposition.