Progress of Science in Kuhn’s Paradigm

Kuhn explains the progress of science without appeal to the concept of truth or truthlikeness. He does not agree with the common view which considers the accumulation of confirmed theories as the cause of progress in science. From his viewpoint, the scientific revolution was an interruption which led to an incommensurable paradigm.Drawing on approximation, he rejects ultimate truth as the final goal of science and attributes the complexity of scientific branches to unfocused transitions. From his point of view, progress is the capacity of a paradigm in providing an appropriate background for research on specific and specialized issues and in solving its own internal puzzles. The present paper argues that in spite Kuhn’s view that revolutions are interruptions his claim is not confirmed by the history of science and as his critiques have argued even in his so-called revolutions many of the results of the past researches are maintained. In his later works, Kuhn himself acknowledges that the concept of revolution needs to be revisited.