The oil rents, entrepreneurship and government administrative structure in Iran

In this paper, the effects of interaction between oil rents, entrepreneurship and government administrative structure in Iran is analyzed. The main questions of this study are (1) is the existence of oil rents caused the government in the oil-exporting developing countries (including Iran), do not feel the need to reform its structure and (2) does decentralization increase the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. The research method of this paper is descriptive and causal-comparative. The results show that the answer to both questions is yes. In general, governments in oil-exporting developing countries establish a rentier and centralized structure that shape a business environment which has a negative effect on entrepreneurship. It is expected that at a decentralized administrative structure than a centralized administrative structure is exploited more entrepreneurial opportunities. Government to promote the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities in the country should primarily act to modify its structure to a decentralized structure.