The Theorems of Virtue and Indecency: Noetic of Rational

This paper intends to prove the noetic nature of the theorems of virtue and indecency and to refute their being rational. First, the viewpoints of such scholars as Alpharabius, Avicenna, and Muhaqiq Ṭūsī who have considered the theorems of virtue and indecency as being among the generally accepted premises have been presented. Next, two interpretations from the viewpoint of those scholars was mentioned: Lāhījī views the theorems of virtue and indecency as being certain and even obvious. However, Muḥaqiq Isfahani considers this issue as generally accepted. The truth is that one can understand the rationality and noesis of the theorems of virtue and decency in the words of the famous Islamic scholars, because one theorem may from one aspect be among the certainties which its truth is proven with definite proof and from another perspective, it is among the generally accepted premises which has no reality except fame and conformity with the opinions of the wise. Furthermore, the reasoning of Muḥaqiq Isfahani has been dealt with. This argument that because the theorems of virtue and indecency are not obvious so then they are generally accepted has not been accepted, because one cannot conclude irrationality owing to the absence of obviousness. As for the second argument which states that the wise pass verdict on virtue and indecency purely on the grounds of preserving the social order, it became clear that the wise, in relation to the validity for the verdicts, pay attention to the real interests and corruptions. Therefore, their verdict has a rational origin and is not purely derived from validity.