Comparing the Viewpoints of Qāḍī Sa īd Qummī and  Allāma Majlisī Concerning Essential and Attributive Unity

Essential and attributive unity are considered among the most important types of unity. In this writing, the views and ideas of Qāḍī Sa‘īd Qummī and ‘Allāma Majlisī concerning this issue are studied. These two great thinkers, besides being disagreed upon the meaning of essential unity (tawḥīd-i dhātī), are totally different, and rather contradictory, on the ontological principles and substructures, on the basis of which they have proved the essential unity and have discrepancies about the attributive unity, as well. One of the discourses associated with attributive unity is the doctrine of the objectivity of essence and attributes. ‘Allāma Majlisī is among its proponents and Qāḍī Sa‘īd Qummī is among the opponents; however, he accepts objectivity at the Divinity level. Acceptance of principality of existence and its essential concomitants drives ‘Allāma Majlisī toward reconciliation between tashbīh (assimilation) and tanzīh (Divine Transcendence); but Qāḍī Sa‘īd’s opposition to these principles and his belief in detachment of ranks in the existence of God, has led him to partiality to the theory of tanzīh as essence and tashbīh as attributes.