Political Supervision of The Parliament through The Interpretation of Ministers, and its governing objections

One of the important functions of the Parliament, is supervision of it on current affairs and the implementation of laws by the Executive. In this regard, Constitutional legislator is recognized some monitoring tools for The Parliament. According to Article (89) of Constitution, one of the methods of parliamentary oversight of the executive authorities, is »The Interpellation« of ministers on how to implement and carry out their legal duties and The Parliament can ask the ministers to explain their actions and, in case of non-persuasion, vote to dismiss them. Despite Constitutional legislators concern regarding of nation's representatives supervision the performance of executive officials through Interpellation, practical experience over the years of Article (89) reign, shows that this monitoring tool could not play effective role in parliamentary supervision of the executive and In practice, this also leads to disruptions in executive performance and in the relationship between the two powers. The question is that what is the principles and objections governing The Interpellation that caused the ineffectiveness of this tool? In this regard, Limit the scope of The Interpellation to the duties of the ministers, The necessity to reform the quorum to The Interpellation, Use of other supervisory methods, such as The Notification and The Questions before The Interpellation plan, and the prevention of its being used to put political pressure in line with efficiency, are regular and It is necessary and just to make fair The Interpellation plan process.