A Decision-Making Model in a Cyber Conflicts Acted Upon Vulnerability, Based on Game Theoretic Analysis

It is crucial to predict the other side possible actions in any conflict, especially in cyber security and cyberwars. In this paper, based on game theoretic analytical model, the decision-making process of two rivals during detection of vulnerability is discussed in cyberspace. Comparing the earlier approaches, the assumptions are made more realistic, such as possible retaliation of the opposed side, asymmetrical payoffs and risk of failure during usage of vulnerability and penetration. In order to achieve this goal, a new structure is proposed based on real conflicts in cyberwar. The proposed game is in extensive form with imperfect information in which the vulnerability is detected by chance for players. Based on Nash equilibrium concept, analytical approach proves that whenever players’ ability for cyber-attack are close together, both sides will attend aggressive acts. The ability to detect vulnerabilities has less impact on strategy.