An Investigation of the Moral Hazard of Controlling Shareholders and Financing Constraints

Profitability is one of the goals that any economies follow. Gaining profit needs access to financial resources, although funding is not often easy and suffer some obstacles. In this regard, controlling shareholders might hamper the amount of resources obtained. Hence, this paper investigates the relationship between the moral hazard of controlling shareholders and financing constraints. The moral hazard of the controlling shareholders is measured by control-ownership wedge variable. Financial data of 17 business groups that their parents are listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and Fara Bourse is collected between 2011 from 2017 (611 year-company). The data is analyzed by GLS method. The results show that companies with a higher moral hazard suffer more financing problems. Thus, companies with higher ownership-control wedge experience more cash flow sensitivity and incur higher cost of equity. In addition, the ownership-control wedge in complex ownership structure's companies associated with agency costs and investment inefficiency positively.