A Review of the Methodological Theory of Popper's falsification and its functioning in the humanities

The falsity from the viewpoint of its followers is not the criterion of meaning or standard of truth, rather, it is the only criterion for separating science from non-science and semiotics. Popper, in the view of falsity with the idea of approaching truth, comes with inductive belief in rationality and scientific progress, and preserves the optimism of modern philosophy for the role of science in society and human history; But he does not consider the empirical basis for scientific theories and introduces the theory as a temporary conjecture that is proposed to solve the problems of previous theories. He considers the function of experience to be in critique and revocation, and emphasizes that experience is not involved in proving or confirming a theory. He not only sees this logic in the current natural sciences, but also sees this method and logic in the theorizing in the social sciences. In this article, we examine the epistemological foundations and the results of Popper's falsification in the natural and social sciences and eventually examine them.