The Role of Accounting Conservatism in the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance

Today, maintaining public interest, observance of shareholders' rights, transparency of information and the obligation of companies to perform social responsibility are among the most important ideals that have been considered more than past by various supervisory and enforcement agencies. The realization of these ideals requires the existence of solid laws and proper implementation mechanisms, the most important of which is corporate governance. Corporate governance can reduce the problem of agency between shareholders and managers, but for this purpose, it is necessary to use a support mechanism that can reduce the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and provide credible accounting information for all stakeholders and improve the variable Ownership. This mechanism is an accounting conservatism.
The sample of the study consisted of 104 firm listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2010–2018. As for performance, it was measured by two proxies: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q the results of the survey show that accounting conservatism cannot consolidate and strengthen the positive impact of ownership structure on firm performance by reducing the conflict of interest and information asymmetry.