Rethinking the Strategy of Deterrence with the Application of the Theory of Constructivism

One of the main issues of the deterrence is rationality and logic of the enemies that have long existed as a theory and strategy, but in the contemporary international system it has taken a new dimension. In deterrence, the rationale of enemies is assumed, so if enemies are not rational, deterrence will not be possible. Indeed, if the enemies are not logical, none of the deterrent strategies will work. Therefore, the main question of the present research is that how will different perceptions of international actors of logic and rationality affect deterrence strategy?In this article, in the framework of constructivism, it is argued that in complex containment, on the one hand, to the extent that the common knowledge and similar structural features are more symmetrical among the actors, the relations are also more linear and the probability of optimal deterrence is increased. On the other hand, whatever components of the social structure of deterrence have less symmetry and more actors involved, the likelihood of a deterioration of the system into a malicious system and falling into the trap of deterrence and security challenge is further increased.