An Analysis of the Theory of Ḥikāyat, Essential Denotation of Mental Ideas and Forms, in `Ilm-i Ḥuṣulī. Acquired Knowledge, as Viewed by Professor Fayyāḍī

Epistemological discussion of the nature of ḥikāyat is known as one of the fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology. Muslim epistemologists also have different views on the nature and actuality of ḥikāyat. Popular Muslim epistemologists, have taken ḥikāyat as dhātī bāb-i burhān, natural of the demonstration, and waṣf-i bi`lfi`l-i ṣūrathā-yi dhihnī, actual quality of mental forms. Some believe that only in the level of taṣdīq, affirmation, one may agree with ḥikāyat-i bi`lfi`l, while in the level of taṣawwurāt, mental forms,and qaḍāyā, propositions, it is bilquwwah, potential. Contrary to these views, Fayyāḍī has viewed ḥikāyat as dhātī bāb-i Isagoge and bi`lfi`l in mental forms. In this article, an attempt has been made to clarify new dimensions of the issue by analytically explaining Fayyāḍī's point of view and examining the criticisms in the field. Accurate explanation of the concepts having to do with the process in the opinions of this philosopher shows that there are no criticisms of his view and such critiques as ignoring the role of the cognitive agent in the process of ḥikāyat or lack of any evidence denoting the claim may not be agreed with.