Ibn Timiya's objections on definition's part of Aristotlian/Avicennean logic

Through history many have challenged philosophy and logic. Ibn Timiya not only challenges Aristotlian/Avicennean philosophy, but their logic. He presented his discussions in details in many books, but in Arrado Alal Almanteqeen book, based on the the two-part conception of logic (concept and judgment) and discussing his two claims about each part of logic, he systematize his objections. This book has four sections: 1) Notion of desired is only possible through definition. 2) Definition is knowledge of conceptions. 3) Affirmation of desired is only possible through deduction. 4) Deduction or logical argument provides knowledge of affirmation. Ibn Timiya presents his ideas in two positive and negative ways, as 1 and 3 are negative and 2 and 4 are positive. According to Ibn Timiya neither positive nor negative claims of logicians are true. He provides eleven reasons against 1 and seven reasons against 2, mean while he objects to the components of definition. This paper deals with Ibn Timiya's general objections to Aristotlelian logic (based on some verses from Quran) and also his (positive and negative) objections to the conception part of the Aristotelian logic. At times, he compares these with some empiricist philosophers. In addition to his objections, his main claims against essentialism and rejection of distinction between essense and attributes and rejection of the distinction between conception and judgment are discussed.