Subject of Metaphysics:A Critique of Natorp's Neo-Kantian Approach Based on Hamelin's Interpretation

As it is well known, Aristotle in his Metaphysics seeks a science subsumed under different rubrics of “prime philosophy”, “wisdom”, “the study of being qua being”, and “theology”. The relation between these different titles of Metaphysics has been formulated by Paul Natorp as an insoluble paradox: the subject matter of prime philosophy cannot be both being qua being (being in general) and divine being (the supreme being) at the same time. Since Natorp, there has always been a controversy on this paradox as well as the problem of integrity of different books of Metaphysics. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is twofold. Firstly, we shall scrutinize the neo-Kantian foundation of Natorp’s interpretation of Aristotle; secondly, we shall present Octave Hamelin’s exegesis of Aristotle’s theory of being as an interpretation on the basis of which two seemingly contradictory aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics can be reconciled, and thereby one can find an appropriate solution to this paradox. In fact, we intend to disclose the underlying assumptions lie at the bottom of Natorp’s understanding of Aristotle, and we shall indicate that Hamelin’s ontological interpretation of Metaphysics is so fertile that provides us with an appropriate measure to avoid confronting such contradictions.