The Process for Human Action to Be Realized as Viewed by Ibn Sina and the Latter-Day Wittgenstein

Ibn Sina, one of the followers of the causal view in explaining the relationship between action and thought, believes that all voluntary human behaviors are realized after the stages of imagination, acknowledgment of usefulness, strong desire and will. He considers mental idea including that of sensation, imagination or intellect, necessary for the realization of behavior. In contrast, the late Wittgenstein, using the concept of language game and the world-image, denies the role of belief in behavior. By citing examples of breech, he shows that human behavior is instinctive and lacks a cognitive component. He even considers belief to be a function of human action. An analysis of Wittgenstein's examples of breech shows that he did not distinguish the element of cognition claimed by philosophers from conscious conception and concluded from a lack of actual attention that there was a lack of cognitive component; He also did not pay attention to the differences in the levels of awareness and considered the negation of certain levels of it as the absolute negation of ideas in practice. Some of Wittgenstein's examples are inconsistent with his principles in language games