Proposing an Optimal Strategy in Water Allocation Using Non-Cooperative Game Theory

Deteriorated quality and scarcity of water are two serious problems and the water resources management corresponding to these problems is often accompanied by conflict between consumers. The purpose of this study is to analyze the behaviors and interactions of stakeholders in the Karaj basin in order to provide optimal strategy in sustainable policy-making of water resources in this basin with respect to environmental protection. In this study, definitions of stability were used to analyze the results of the Graph model in non-cooperative game theory. Players include the Ministry of Agriculture, the Regional Water Company, the Farmers and the Department of Environment. The results of the Graph model showed that among the definitions of stability used in this study, Non-Myopic stability analysis is reliable for the analysis of this game and the output of this stability is more likely to occur in the behavior of players. One of the most desirable equilibrium states is the basic situation and the other equilibrium state is the situation in which farmers perform unauthorized withdrawals of irrigation canals, in which case an undesirable situation will occur in the future. Therefore, the water resources management in the basin can be improved by determining incentives from the regional water company for the cooperation of farmers and their training, as well as identifying and punishing violators. Finally, the results showed that using appropriate stability definitions can provide valuable insights for policy-making to analyze specific conflict, when there is uncertainty about player behavior.