Moving from Ross's Principlism to Moderate Principlism in Moral Reasoning

The present study aims to defend moderate moral principlism in moral reasoning. According to this type of principlism - in a moral argument - although one of the premises of the argument is a moral principle, the position and situation in which the action is performed can be considered as another premise of the argument. To clarify and defend this principlism, it is necessary to analyze and examine competing approaches such as racial originality and moral particularism to provide a basis for endorsing this view. In this research, first, a report on Ross's principlism and his definition of principlism is presented. Dency's critiques and objections to Ross's definition are then expressed, and at the same time, Dency's particularism is examined. Finally, moderate moral principlism is defended. The result of the above arguments will be that in a moral argument all aspects must be considered - including principle, position and situation - and the approaches of extreme absolutism and moral principlism are not maximally successful, because at least they cannot solve the problem of moral conflict.