The Early Wittgenstein: The Opposition of Language and Metaphysics

In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein attempts to make a distinction between two levels of the states of affairs in order to have a logical and accurate view of the world. For Wittgenstein, metaphysics, ethics, religion, and art belong to the realm of the Transcendental about which you can’t say anything. Rather, it can only be demonstrated. He refers to it as nonsense for it is meta-linguistic. The empirical world or nature is the realm which can be talked about and judged, since it is a picture of reality and the criterion for the truth of propositions, which is the pictorial relationship between language and reality. For Wittgenstein, precise understanding of the world requires the mentioned necessary distinction. He believes that the main metaphysical problem which philosophers historically encountered was due to the lack of this distinction and abuse of language. In fact, by making such a distinction he seeks to secure metaphysical propositions and protect them from philosophers’ interference. This implies Wittgenstein's mystical approach to this field. In this article, we will try to make it clear that Wittgenstein, through linguistic approach, made a distinction between linguistic and nonlinguistic state of affairs, and that this distinction is in itself a contradiction.