A Critical Reading of the Nature of the Moral according to Nishida Kitarō (Kyoto School)

In this paper we critically examine the nature of the moral in Nishida Kitarō’s views, by drawing on a descriptive-analytic method, and through a content analysis of some of his works. In Nishida’s view, the moral is grounded in a number of fundamental philosophical proposi-tions. This requires some explanation, to which this research is partly devoted. The main question is what a morally good action is in Nishida’s view? According to Nishida, a morally good action is one that spontane-ously arises from a moderate character. A moral action is characterized as genuine and non-genuine. A morally good action leads one toward uni-ty—unity with being, one’s authentic self, and others. The desire towards the other and unity with it constitutes the core of a moral ‘ought.’ The notions of loyalty, love, and responsibility towards others come from this desire or force. A good genuine action tends to unity and the center, whereas morally bad actions tend toward plurality and escape from the center. The center rests on a metaphysical foundation of the absolute entity. Nishida’s moral philosophy is descriptive in character, lacking any normative dimension in the most specific sense of the term. The pa-per ultimately aims to present foundational and superficial critiques of Nishida’s latter idea. Finally, we criticize and ask questions about the moral in Nishida’s philosophy.