Kinds and Classical Works of Internalism/Externalism Debates in Metaethics

With regard to the importance and prevalence of internalism/externalism debates in metaethics, and the absence of sufficiently illuminating Persian works on the distinction of the different types of internalism/externalism, and the need for introducing classical literature in this field, this article seeks to present and distinguish certain accounts of three kinds of internalism/externalism, to explain their positions in metaethical discussions, and finally to highlight some achievements of the classic works as providing the grounds for more recent disputes. These three kinds of internalism/externalism are internalism/externalism about moral truths reasons internalism/externalism and motivational internalism/externalism. The internalist in these debates maintains that there is a necessary (though defeasible) connection respectively between moral truths and reasons for action, or between having reason and having a preceding desire, or between moral judgment and motivation while the externalist denies the necessary connection in each case. The internalism/externalism distinction about moral truths sets moral rationalists like Kantians apart from others. Werner Falk and William Frankena started the initial debate on motivational internalism/externalism. Thomas Nagel and Philippa Foot paid special attention to reasons internalism/externalism. The achievements of these philosophers in their classical works formulated considerable theories in terms of which some following critical debates would be framed.