From Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics to Derrida’s Deconstruction

In many studies, the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer has been contrasted with Derrida’s deconstruction so as to emphasize their differences and oppositions. Pointing out the conceptual congruence between these two important contemporary interpretative currents, the present study, while acknowledging the differences in the works and writings of Gadamer and Derrida, empathetically attempts to reflect on the similarity and convergence of the singularities of their thought. Therefore, this paper discusses and explores Gadamer’s and Derrida’s views on concepts such as language and sign, truth and meaning, interpretation, and method, and attempts to show that the two thinkers come together in terms of intellectual relations, as illustrated by principles such as: Being is divisive and different in itself, the rejection of the transcendental signified, the emergence of the most self-sufficient language in writing, the risk of the creation of ambiguity and deception by speech and writing, the disbelief in a unified interpretation and truth, the concrete, and fluid nature of understanding, the creation of meaning, and the rejection of method. Thus, this study attempts to rectify some of the common theoretical misconceptions about philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction.