The effect of agency costs on the relationship between ownership structure and investment sensitivity to cash flow

In full capital markets, all companies are expected to have easy access to resources outside the company, and investment decisions are based solely on expected future profitability, and access to domestic capital has no effect on decisions. But in the real world, due to the asymmetric information mechanism, the cost of financing using internal and external sources is different, and in these environments, asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower on the company's ability to achieve credit and investment power and activity. Their economy is impressive. Therefore, in the present study, the effect of agency costs on the relationship between ownership structure and investment sensitivity to cash flow in companies member of the Tehran Stock Exchange has been investigated. For this purpose, a sample of 107 companies active in the Tehran Stock Exchange, including a seven-year period based on the financial statements of the companies studied during the years 1392 to 1398 was selected and to test the hypotheses by multivariate linear regression method with Using EVIEWS software version 9, was used. The results indicate that agency costs have a significant and inverse effect on the relationship between managerial and institutional ownership and investment sensitivity to cash flow.