The Tension Between Faith and Reason in Islamic Tradition: A Case Study of Imam Muhammad Ghazali

While there is no real tension between faith and reason for Muslim scholars, in post-Kantian philosophy of religion there have been serious doubts about the rationality of religious doctrines. It is noteworthy that Ghazali’s critiques of philosophical reasoning are totally different from Kant’s. Ghazali denied the reliability of pure reasoning without the help of faith, while Kant denied the access of reason to the intangible world. By paying attention to Kant’s philosophy for understanding the very difference of the faith/reason tension in Islamic tradition and contemporary philosophy of religion and employing an extra-religious approach and an analytical-critical method, the present research has studied Ghazali’s corpus and concluded what concerned Ghazali was faith, not reason; since he held that only a pious believer could be saved from the hell. He was not concerned about reasoning without revelation and religious belief. Ghazali maintained that philosophical reasoning falls short of the truth of affairs. One could say, from a different point of view, he was aware of the limits of reasoning in the same way as Kant was; but unlike Kant, through faith, he arrived at matters which are far from the access of reason. Finally, although in Kant’s thoughts, faith has lost its rational bases, Ghazali was not in the same situation. He held that mystical, prophetical reasoning, which he called “al-Qalb” (the Heart), could obtain the truth and has no conflict with faith and revelation, and it is just human reasoning that makes judgments that could come in conflict with religious beliefs. Previous research saw Ghazali as fideistic; although thinking of him of rationalist or fideistic, could be easy based on his Ashʿari commitment, but after enough reflection on his works, it turns out to be difficult to do so because one could find both evidence for his rationality or fideism. Regarding his prioritizing faith over reason, there is a lot of textual evidence in his corpus; his tendency toward reason is not very explicit but can be perceived implicitly from his works. Despite his efforts to emphasize revelation and faith, as well as left human reasoning for revelation, what arises afterward, which has a kind of validity even for him, is the same common reason. Ghazali interpreted the prima facie meaning of Quranic verses which are impossible from a rational viewpoint, such as the corporeality of God. There is no middle ground between faith and reason, and yet Ghazali still stands in the very middle; thus, he could not be seen as just fideistic. If he wanted to demarcate what could be interpreted, he would have taken the side of reason. At the same time, comparing his rationality with Descartes’ is a naïve position to hold. Mystic-minded Ghazali did not see the issue of faith and reason like a philosopher and, ultimately, due to his obedience to God, as well as the fact that his main concern is salvation, he prioritized faith over reason. It is not possible to speak of tension or competence for a mystic-minded like him.