Bewilderment of Moral Agents in the Context of Uncertainty and Doubts

This paper is a research into different versions and implications of normative uncertainty. To do so, I provide a brief account of uncertainty in ontological, epistemological, social, and psychological domains, and drawing on the method of descriptive-analytic research, I roughly consider the impact of uncertainties on normative ethics. Given the uncertainty, real consequences of events, knowledge of events and their ramifications, constancy of the states of moral agents, and social reactions are not determinate, and the existence of constant moral laws is dubious. On the one hand, moral criteria are not sufficient for decisions in the normative domain, and on the other hand, normative uncertainly has specific implications along with the subjectivist or objectivist reading. Given moral uncertainty and its combination with other uncertainties, the decision-making process becomes more complicated, since under such circumstances the moral agent does not face the right/wrong or the permissible/impermissible option. Rather, she might face maximally right and minimally wrong options. Moreover, in acting upon the maximal alternative, blaming the moral agent leads to the violation of morality.