Evaluating the Assumption of Equality Between Arguments for and Against the Doctrine of Union Between Intellecting Subject and its Intelligible Object

In the process of reasoning, the self-analysis of reason is common in all schools of Islamic philosophy. Some have succeeded in this difficult test and some have failed and have been doomed to skepticism and agnosticism. The question of the union of the intellecting subject and the intelligible object is among those issues in which the intellect deals with the ability, realm and quality of its own reasoning. Various aspects of epistemology, ontology and psychology are manifested in this issue. This has made theorizing this doctrine doubly difficult. Influenced by the inadequacy of some of his principles, Ibn Ṣīnā has considered part of its realm as absurd and accused the one who believes in it to lack understanding. Only Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to revive and reconstruct this doctrine, both on the basis of the principles of the common philosophy, even those accepted by Ibn Ṣīnā, and on a higher level on the basis of the specific principles of his own Transcendent philosophy. In Transcendent philosophy, important epistemological and anthropological results are expected and the rational justification of some original religious beliefs is subject to a transcendent analysis of it. A researcher has considered either side of the dispute incapable to prove their claim and has himself claimed the deferment of judgment. An analysis shows that this claim is based on misinterpretations of the positive arguments proposed by Mullā Ṣadrā, and the claim of equality between arguments for and against the doctrine of the unity of the intellect, the intellecting subject and its intelligible object can be rejected.