Examining and Criticizing Mullā Ṣadrā’s Explicit Account of Fārābī’s Viewpoint about Individuation

That “what makes an individual being the one it is” has been a question great thinkers have long tried to resolve. As the innovator or strong advocate of the doctrine of existential primacy of existence over the quiddity, Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī maintains that the individuation of a thing depends on the mode of its existence. He believes that this standpoint was also held by Fārābī. He has confirmed this attribution in eight of his works: asfār, sharḥ al-ḥidāya al-athīriyya, al-rasāʾil al-tisʿa, al-ḥāshīya ʿalá ilāhiyyāt al-shifāʾ, al-mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād, risāla fī al-tashakhuṣ, risāla al-limmiyya and risāla fī ittiṣāf al-māhiyya bi al-wujūd; however, he does not mention any evidence for this attribution. By reviewing the documents, this writing evaluates this Mullā Ṣadrā’s explicit attribution and shows that it is not the case. This evaluation results from three arguments and pieces of evidence: some other attributions of Ṣadrā, the explicit opinions of Fārābī himself, and reviewing this viewpoint based on the principle of recognizing the predecessors in the light of the successors. These indicate that Mullā Ṣadrā is the first who has made such a claim. This article is not limited to description only, rather, based on a general principle, it provides an explanation why such an invalid attribution has been occurred.