Kant on "die Züfllichkeit" in the realm of theoretical reason

The contingent is always a kind of menace for metaphysical systems. Kant uses die Zufälligkeit, and we first must consider its implications in his theoretical philosophy in order to find his position on the menace of contingency for the system of science (Wissenschaft). Our study shows that Kant has in different occasions used this term (die Zufälligkeit) in some different but related meanings; Tracing Kant’s usage of the term through its Critique of pure Reason, this paper examines how Kant have confronted to the situation of the accidental in the necessary system of science. The conclusion is that Kant does not resolve this tension, because on the one hand he ignores contingency in favor of necessity, and claims that a system as a pure science required to avoid from the contingency in his transcendental system; and on the other hand, he gives a place to contingency in order to be able to explain how reason progresses in its series of dialectical inferences. Therefore, Kant only has dissolved and not solved the crucial tension, and its sublimation is possible only through another non-Kantian models of dialectic.