A Critical Study of the Relationship between Non–Materiality of Knowledge and Constancy of Change

Allāmah Ṭabāṭabāyī, in his justification of the epistemic discussions tied to non–materiality, in particular non–materiality of the perception and the fact that the material things are subject to knowledge and understanding, proposes constancy of change and states that change in its own changing is constant. The present paper is an attempt to provide a comprehensive critical study of the paradoxical nature of “constancy of the change” and its relation to non–materiality of knowledge. First and foremost, we focus on our specific criticisms levelled against constancy of change: the difference between the meaning of non–materiality and the meaning of constancy in constant material things, non–materiality of immobility, non–materiality of all of the material things, the problem of losing continuity in a specific constant, the confusion of permanency of motion/change with permanent motion/change, a counterexample refuting the necessity of non–materiality in knowledge and mental images, and, ultimately, the issue of infinite regress. And since some of the contemporaries too have found the paradoxical nature of constancy of change undesirable, we will have a short discussion on their criticisms and evaluations as well.