A Critical Study of Subjective and Objective Componentsof Thaddeus Metz’s Theory of Meaning in life
Thaddeus Metz, by developing a non-consequentialist theory on meaning in life, has tried to provide a relatively complete explanation of the meaning of most people's lives. Metz’s theory is based on two components: 1) “rational nature” as a subjective component and 2) “the fundamental conditions of human existence” as an objective component. This article through an analytical-critical approach, first examines Metz's argument and its components, then explains some important objections raised against the components of Metz's theory, that is, :1) defending the meaningconferring of the consequentialist view of the meaning in life, 2) the incompatibility of Metz’s theory with human intuition, 3) lack of attention to the role of emotional aspects, 4) meaning-conferring of some necessary conditions, 5)the problem with the sufficiency of fundamental conditions for meaning, 6) the inability of fundamental conditions to explain the meaning of some works of art, and 7) ignoring the meaningfulness of an artificial intelligence’s actions. Although Metz’s theory is considered defensible to most of the objections, it has been shown that his theory in the subjective aspect is problematic. Based on the Robot Problem, it can be argued that without the need for transcendence and going beyond the animal nature, meaningfulness is possible. If it is possible to regard the computational aspect of artificial intelligence as a part of the rational nature of humans, the subjective component of Metz’s theory cannot be defended.
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