Two Interpretations of the Synoptic Knowledge (al–‘Ilm al–Ijmālī) in Avicennian Philosophy and Its Ability in Resolving the Complicated Formulae Objection Refuting the Mental Existence

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western philosophers are still unknown to Muslim philosophers. For example, Husserl’s complicated mathematical formulae objection says that no man can imagine e.g. polygons with several million sides. So, there is no mental existence for the complicated. Although imagining the complicated, in its general sense, in mind has not been argued as a philosophical problem by Muslim thinkers, sometimes some of them have proposed some similar issues and said that we are of the synoptic knowledge (al–‘ilm al–ijmālī) about them. The first resolution to suggest, on the basis of the well-known principles of Muslim Philosophy, especially of Avicennian Philosophy, too is the very synoptic knowledge. But, can the synoptic knowledge and/or its reconstruction be a worthy response to the complicated? The synoptic knowledge itself can be interpreted in two different ways: (1) actual uncompounded knowledge – that is unconscious; (2) potential knowledge. We will argue that (1) cannot be accepted eventually. Thus, we will refute unconscious knowledge absolutely – either unconscious knowledge of Muslim philosophers or that of such western philosophers as Leibniz – by means of several proofs. But (2) is acceptable by itself. So, we will show that such a knowledge sometimes can be found in us and also such things as the scientific art can be analyzed by means of the very potential knowledge. Finally, we will investigate the very acceptable potential synoptic knowledge how much can be applicable in the case of the complicated formulae objection.