Prohibition of Ijtihād against Naṣṣ (Statute); a Rule or Formalist Perusal of Interpretation

The argument based on the prohibition of ijtihād against naṣṣ emphasizes the existence of a prior, explicit, certain, definite, conclusive and meaning independent from the reader and interpreter. What is presented in the form of this proposition relies on the interpretive approach of the subject-interpreter. This article research, which was conducted with a descriptive-analytical approach and reliance library sources, shows that such an attitude does not include all interpretive approaches and cannot be cited as a principle-interpretive rule, because apart from the different impressions of the concept of naṣṣ, the way to call a referent (miṣdāq) in terms of proof is also a point of disagreement. Similarly, a distinction should be made between ijtihād against the appearance and ijtihād against the spirit and the intension of the text. The uṣūlī principle, “every ruling is based on a reason on which it was devised” limits the application of the prohibition of ijtihād against naṣṣ; e.g., not cutting off a thief’s hand in a year of famine and delaying the implementation of legal punishment of theft in other cases.