Metaphysics in Wittgenstein: Denial or Necessity

The present article explores the issue of metaphysics and its position in Wittgenstein’s thought using a descriptive-analytical method. To accomplish this, several points are highlighted. Firstly, there is a kind of continuity between Wittgenstein’s ideas. Secondly, metaphysics serves as one of the elements that can be used to assert a connection between Wittgenstein's views. Thirdly, based on these two points, metaphysics is not rejected in Wittgenstein's philosophy but rather deemed necessary. Since Wittgenstein’s primary interest was to discover meaning through the relationship between language and reality, he argued that language could only represent a part of reality due to its limitations. However, a component of reality - the essential part - cannot be expressed by language but may just be showed. Wittgenstein demonstrated that reality extends beyond what language conveys by drawing definitive boundaries around language and knowledge in both his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. While in Tractatus he adopts a moral approach to distinguish what can be said and what can be shown, characterizing essential concepts such as God, morality, and religion as what can just be shown, in his Philosophical Investigations he adopts an aesthetic approach to demarcate what can be known and what can be shown. Furthermore, given the position assigned to them by Wittgenstein, metaphysical concepts are descriptive norms that serve as foundations of empirical and scientific knowledge. Finally, we show that metaphysical concepts are not only undeniable in both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations but also necessary components of Wittgenstein’s thought in arriving at his notion of reality.