Developing a Threat-Tolerability Bilateral Concept within a Differential Game for the Analysis of the Insider/Adversary Behavior in Operational environment

Threat-tolerability as an innovative bilateral concept that focuses on the analysis of insider/adversary behavior is proposed. A zero sum differential game is designed to model the interaction between the two introduced state variables, threat and tolerability. A Lanchester-type equations is used to present the dynamics of threat-tolerability due to contradictory behavior of insider and adversary. The main advantage of the proposed method is that it could help to optimize the two side player’s strategies and actions during the game period based on threat-tolerability dynamic. As the game progresses each player observes game position, i.e., the threat level for targets and tolerability level for insider and tries to schedule its resources to influence final game’ profits. Player could resolve offensive, defensive and maneuvering share on total available resources. Deciding on extent resources used for each strategy can be considered as control input for each player to change game’s profits. A simple tracking scenario is used to demonstrate how threat and tolerability dynamics could be used as a tool for optimal resource assignment.